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STRUCTURE AND PROSPECTS OF THE 
ASEAN FINANCIAL AND BANKING SYSTEMS: 
A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE PHILIPPINES 
Mario B. Lamberte* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As a political grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or Asean has already 
made significant strides. The peace and stability in the region is one example of these political 
achievements. As an economic grouping, however, the Asean has not achieved much. 
Intra-Asean trade and investment still continue their historical patterns where greater 
interdependence between two or three Asean countries exists not because of an Asean 
cooperative endeavor but because of their long, established economic relationship. The 
substantial trade and investment flows between Singapore and Malaysia typify this relationship. 
This is not to say that no efforts were exerted to improve intra- Asean trade and investment On 
the contrary, both Asean governments and private sectors have been actively involved in 
designing and implementing several cooperation programs. Admittedly, the performance of the 
various cooperative efforts are uneven. 
This study examines Asean financial cooperative efforts and their implications for improving 
intra-Asean trade and investment. The Philippine perspective will be emphasized. 
II. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
The last two years of Ferdinand Marcos' presidency of the Philippines proved devastating to 
the domestic economy. Serious political instability and economic uncertainty plunged the 
economy into a recession in two consecutive years, 1984 and 1985 (Figure 1). The economy 
bounced back remarkably well starting in 1986 when Corazon Aquino took over the reins of the 
government. Gross national product (GNP) real growth rate accelerated and hit 6.6 percent in 
1988. However, it decelerated to S.6 percent the following year as bottlenecks to the rapid 
economic recovery became more pronounced and coup d'etat threats by disgruntled military 
officers persisted. 
"Vice-President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 
Figure 1 
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Consumption propelled the growth in the first two years of the Aquino administration. Then 
demand shifted, to investment to augment the productive capacities of the economy. This 
acceleration in investment growth, however, did not compensate for the decline in the growth 
rate of consumption. Thus, aggregate demand softened in 1989. 
Based on sectoral performance, Figure 2 shows that only the agricultural sector was spared of 
the crisis that struck in 1984- 85. It posted a negative growth only in 1983 and 1987 as a result of 
devastating typhoons and prolonged drought that visited the country in these years. In contrast, 
both the industry and services sectors posted negative growth rates during the crisis years. The 
services sector first led the recovery; later the industry sector took the lead. 
Interesting developments also took place in the external sector. First, the composition of 
exports changed substantially in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1960s, the Philippines was basically 
exporting agricultural and mineral products. By the 1980s, manufactured exports comprised 
more than 50 percent of total exports. Classifying exports into traditional and non- traditional 
exports, the latter comprised a mere 8 percent of total exports in 1970. By 1987, its share went 
up to 73 percent. Increasing market diversification of exports is also notable in the 1970s and the 
1980s. The share in total exports of traditional trading partners has been going down since. In 
particular, the US share fell from 42 percent in 1970 to 35 percent in 1987, while that of Japan, 
from 40 percent to 17 percent over the same period. The slack was taken up mostly by the 
developing member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), particularly Hong Kong, South Korea, and the Asean group1. 
Exports grew rapidly between 1970 and 1980 averaging 21 percent per year, but declined in 
the first half of the 1980s as a result of political and economic uncertainties. With very low 
confidence in the performance of Filipino exporters in their export orders, many traditional and 
potential buyers of Philippine products shifted to other countries for supply. Exports recovered 
steadily during the second half of the 1980s (Figure 3). 
The economic recovery in 1986-88 took place alongside a surge in demand for imports 
outracing that of exports. Moreover, some of the leading merchandise exports, e.g., garments and 
electronics, had import content of over 50 percent of export value. Thus, the trade balance 
deteriorated steadily since 1986 reaching almost $2 billion in 1989. The poor performance of the 
external sector is reflected in the balance of payments (BOP), which dipped to negative $541 
million in 1989. 
In 1990, the Philippine economy performed even worse than the previous year as it was 
shaken by the devastating earthquake of July 1990 and by the doubling of petroleum prices 
caused by the Middle East war. The economy managed to grow by only 3.1 percent. The 
industrial sector bore the brunt of this economic slowdown. 
Table 1 presents some key economic indicators comparing the performance of the Philippines 
with those of other Asean countries during the period 1981-1988. In almost all indicators, the 
Philippines had the worst performance. In particular, it had the lowest average growth rate in 
1. A more detailed discussion of trade between the Philippines and other ASEAN countries is presented in Chapter ID. 
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Table 1 
Key Economic Indicators: Asean 1981 -1988 
Country/Indicator 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
Indonesia 
GDP (%) 7.9 2.2 4.2 6.0 2.5 4,0 3.6 4.7 4.4 
Per capita GDP (%) 8.0 0.0 1.9 3.7 0.3 1.8 1.4 2.3 2.4 
Exports ($ million) 23,348 19.747 18,689 20,754 18,527 14,396 17.206 19,219 
Growth rate:exports 7.1 -15.4 -5.4 11.0 -10.7 -22.3 19.5 11.7 -0.6 
External debt outstanding 22,723 26,500 30,138 31,952 35,999 43,039 52,581 55,600 
Inflation rate (%) 12.2 9:5 11.8 10.4 4.7 5.9 9.3 6.0 9.0 
Malaysia 
GOP (%) 6.9 5,9 6.3 7.8 -1,0 1.2 5.2 7.8 5.0 
Per capita GDP (%) 4.4 2.8 3.5 5.1 -3.6 -1.5 2.5 4.9 2.3 
Exports ($ million) 11,675 11,966 13,683 16,407 15,133 13,703 17,706 20,627 
Growth raterexports -9.3 2.5 14.3 19.9 -7.8 -9.4 29.2 16.5 7.0 
External debt outstanding a/ 7,544 11,617 14,896 16,249 18,268 19,999 21,675 18,400 
Inflation rate (%) 9.7 5.8 3.7 3.9 0.3 0.7 0.6 2.7 3,4 
Philippines 
GDP (%) 3.9 2.9 0.9 -6.0 -4.3 1.4 4.7 6.6 1.3 
Per capita GDP (%) 1.3 0.4 -1.6 -8.3 -6.6 -1.0 2.2 4.0 -1.2 
Exports ($ million) 5,722 5,021 5,005 5,391 4,629 4,842 5,720 7,074 
Growth rateiexports -1.1 -12.3 -0.3 7.7 -14.1 4.6 18.1 23.7 3.3 
External debt outstanding 20,750 24,299 24,124 24,358 26,190 28,853 29,962 29,900 
Inflation rate (%) 13.1 10.2 10.0 50.4 23.0 0.8 3.8 8.8 15.0 
Singapore 
GDP (%) 9.6 8.9 8.2 8.3 -1.6 1.8 8.6 11.1 6.6 
Per capita GDP (%) 8.3 5.6 6.9 7.0 -2.8 0,7 8.0 9.8 5.4 
Exports ($ million) 19.662 19,435 20,429 22.662 21,533 21,336 27,277 36,000 
Growth rate:exports 8.0 -1.2 5.1 10.9 -5.0 -0,9 27.8 32.0 9.6 
External debt outstanding 2,263 2,629 2,803 3.290 3,406 3,875 4,491 2,260 
Inflation rate (%) 15.5 6.5 3.9 3.9 4.0 -1.4 0.5 1.5 4.3 
Thailand 
GDP (%) 6.3 4.1 7,3 7.1 3.5 4.5 6.4 11.0 6.5 
Per capita GDP (%) 4.1 1.9 5.1 5.1 1.6 2.6 6.4 8.7 4.4 
Exports ($ million) 6,902 6,835 6,308 7,338 7,059 8,803 11,595 15,990 
Growth rate-.exports 7.0 •1.0 -7.7 16.3 -3.B 24.7 31.7 37.9 13.1 
External debt outstanding 10,809 12,198 13,868 14,981 17,528 18.549 20,710 22,000 
Inflation rate (%) 12.7 5.2 3.7 0.9 2.4 1.6 2.5 3.7 4.1 
a/ Excludes short-term debt. 
Source: ADB, Asian Development Outlook, 1989. 
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gross domestic product (GDP). It was also the only country in the region whose average growth 
in per capita remained negative for the entire period. The level of its merchandise exports 
registered the lowest among Asean countries, and the average growth in its exports during the 
same period was the second lowest It was also the only country which realized a double-digit 
average inflation rate. Given this dismal scenario, the Philippines will have a lot of catching up 
to do in the next few years. 
HI. PHILIPPINE TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH ASEAN 
After the Bali Summit Conference in February 1976, the Asean heads of state issued the 
"Declaration of Asean Accord." This declaration provides firm guidelines for the future pattern 
of economic cooperation among Asean countries. The preferential trade arrangements (PTA) and 
joint-venture projects were among the means used to foster economic cooperation. This section 
discusses the growth and patterns of Philippine trade and investment with other Asean countries 
in the 1980s. 
Trade Growth and Patterns 
To describe the trade growth and patterns between the Philippines and other Asean countries, 
the ratio of Philippine trade with Asean to total trade was derived2. This is shown in Figure 4 for 
the period 1980-1987. The ratio was steadily increasing from 7 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 
1985, but it declined thereafter to a level just a little above that in 1980. Surprisingly, no drastic 
change in cooperative agreement among Asean countries occurred in 1985 which could have 
produced a reversal in the trade pattern. It was, therefore, necessary to find out whether the rise 
in the ratio from 1980 to 1987 really reflects a dramatic change in the volume of trade between 
the Philippines and other Asean countries. Thus, Figure 5 presents the dollar value of Philippine 
trade with Asean and total trade. Trade with Asean appears to be flat throughout the indicated 
period with only a slight increase in 1984 and 1985. In contrast, total trade was declining since 
1980 and rebounded only in 1986. Thus, the decline in total trade especially during the crisis 
years of 1984 and 1985 produced the sharply rising ratio of Asean trade to total trade in those 
years. 
One of the intentions of the Asean economic cooperation was to facilitate specialization in 
producing commodities where comparative advantage exists. Table 2 presents the percentage 
distribution of imports from and exports to other Asean countries according to the 10 first-digit 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITQ for 1980, 1985, and 19873. Category 9 
consistently obtained the highest percentage share to total exports. But it cannot be said that the 
Philippines is specializing in the production of this group of commodities because it is obviously 
composed of a basket of commodities totally unrelated to one another. On imports, Category 3 
2. Trade with other ASEAN countries refers to the sum of the value of exports to and imports from ASEAN countries while 
total trade refers to the sum of the value of the Philippines' total imports from and total exports to the world including ASEAN 
countries. 
3. See Appendix 1 for the absolute figures. 
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Figure 4 
Philippine Trade with other ASEAN Countries 
NOTE: ASEAN Trade as X of Total Trade 
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Figure 5 
Philippine Trade with ASEAN and the World 
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consistently topped the list. This is understandable since the Philippines is a net oil importing 
country. 
The results discussed above seem to suggest that Asean economic cooperation has not yet 
produced a discernible improvement in trade between the Philippines and other Asean countries. 
In part, this may be attributed to the deficiencies in the existing Asean PTA. In the first place, 
commodity classification of each of the member countries has not been standardized. The 
Philippine PTA, for instance, includes 3,446 lines that correspond to only 2,913 lines of the 
Philippine Standard Commodity Classification (PSCQ, implying a total of 533 duplications or 
extractions. Also, the PTA does not cover all the commodities listed in a PSCC line. Secondly, 
the provision for an exclusion list for each of the member countries undermines the effectiveness 
of the PTA. A cursory look at the exclusion lists of Asean countries would show the presence of 
several items with substantial trade content Interestingly, the percentages excluded increase with 
import value (Table 3), thus virtually eliminating all potential tradable items. Thirdly, the 
margins of preference (MOP) granted by each of the member countries were very low and not 
enough to induce trade creation and diversion. 
Investment 
Aside from merchandise trade, investment flows are one of the gauges of a successful 
economic cooperation in the region. There are two sources of data on foreign investments in the 
Philippines: the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Central Bank (CB). Both institutions are 
empowered to approve foreign investments. BOI-registered foreign equity investments are 
accorded privileges prescribed under the Omnibus Investment Code, while CB-registered foreign 
investments can enjoy additional privileges such as profit and capital repatriation. There is a big 
difference between the data on foreign investments compiled by the BOI and those reported by 
the CB. The latter reflect actual investment flows while the former are mere expressions of 
foreign investors to commit themselves to invest a certain amount in a particular industry. Thus, 
the BOI figures on foreign investments are always higher than those of the CB. 
Table 4 shows the BOI-approved foreign equity investments in local currency from other 
Asean countries. They fluctuated widely from year to year. The highest recorded was in 1989. 
As a percentage to total BOI-approved foreign equity investments, Asean investments are shown 
to be negligible, except in 1984 when it registered 13 percent. The table also sho\vs that Asean 
investments in the 1980s were dominated by Singapore, except in 1983 and 1984. 
Table 5 gives the CB-registered Asean investments, which are divided into direct foreign 
equity investments and investments in CB-approved securities. Again, the Asean investments 
appear to be negligible. 
Almost all of the Asean direct foreign equity investments flowed in the 1980s. Asean 
investments in securities all occurred in the 1980s. While the BOI records show that the other 
four Asean countries registered direct equity investments in the Philippines, only Singapore and 
Malaysia actually made such investments. 
There are no official records about investments made by Filipinos abroad. Our guess is that 
Filipino investments in the other Asean countries are very small. 
Table 3 
Summary of Items Excluded under the 
Across-the-Board Exchanges 
Total No. of No. of % 
Import Value Range Items Under Items Excluded Excluded 
(in US $) Each Batch 
Indonesia 
Lass than 50,000 743 293 39 
50,000 - 500,000 734 518 71 
500,000-1 M 234 112 48 
1 M - 2.5 M 264 137 52 
2.5M-10M 255 158 62 
Above 10 M 126 66 52 
Total 2,356 1,284 54 
Malaysia 
Less than 50,000 1.717 582 34 
50,000 - 500,000 1,404 331 24 
500,000- 1 M 390 316 81 
1M-2.5M 178 112 63 
2.5M-10M 119 86 72 
Above 10 M 83 72 87 
Total 3.891 1,499 39 
Philippines 
Less than 50,000 1,624 141 9 
50,000 - 500,000 1,122 269 24 
500,000- 1 M 284 92 32 
1M-2.5M 241 164 68 
2.5 M -10 M 229 150 66 
Above 10 M 89 69 78 
Total 3,589 885 25 
Singapore 
Less than 50,000 597 28 5 
50,000 - 500,000 927 16 2 
500,000- 1 M 577 3 1 
1M-2.5M 951 11 1 
2.5 M -10 M 619 11 2 
Above 10 M 510 14 3 
Total 4,181 83 2 
Thailand 
Less than 50,000 1.524 710 47 
50,000 - 500,000 1,131 1,012 89 
500,000-1M 315 124 39 
1 M - 2.5 M 320 163 51 
2.5 M -10 M 228 186 82 
Above 10 M 81 62 77 
Total 3.599 2,257 63 
Source: Tariff Commission, Philippine Tariff Concessions In the 
Asean Preferential Trading Arrangements, 1986. 
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Table 5 
CB-Approved Direct Foreign Equity Investments ^ and 
Investments in Securities of other Asean Countries in the 
Philippines 1970-1988 
(in million US$) 
Country 
Equity 
Ab / Rb/ Securities 
Brunei 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Malaysia 13.10 10.60 0.01 
Singapore 20.62 16.05 1.27 
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total Asean 33.72 26.65 1.28 
Total Non-Asean 3232.92 2875.02 210.81 
Grand Total 3266.64 2901.67 212.09 
a/ Net of cancellations and adjustments, 
b/ A - approved; R - registered. 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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The results above lead to the conclusion that investment flows between the Philippines and 
other Asean countries are still negligible. This is to be expected considering the fact that, except 
for Singapore, Asean countries are typically capital- scarce economies. As noted by Manasan 
(1988), Asean countries are trying to outbid one another in attracting foreign capital by providing 
more generous incentives to foreign investors. 
IV. PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
The Philippine financial system has grown in size and Complexity since the country gained 
independence in 1946. Nevertheless, it still remains underdeveloped compared with those of the 
fast growing economies of its Asian neighbors. 
The financial system has two large submarkets: the regulated and the unregulated markets. 
Several studies point out the importance of the unregulated markets in efficiently mobilizing and 
allocating resources. They have remained large and active especially in the late 1980s when the 
regulated financial markets encountered difficulties as a result of a series of bank failures and the 
economic crisis in the mid-1980s (Lamberte 1989, and Lamberte and Lim 1987). The regulated 
financial markets are supervised mainly by the CB, except the insurance and credit union systems 
which have their respective regulatory bodies. 
In this study, focus is given on the CB-supervised financial system and the insurance system 
because of their implications on Asean cooperation and development. The systems are made up 
of institutions that deal with securitized instruments either in the money markets or in the capital 
markets. The securitized capital markets, supervised by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, will also be discussed. The end of this chapter will assess how the existing financial 
and banking structure will likely enhance or hamper intra-Asean cooperation. 
The Financial System 
The financial system supervised by the CB is commonly referred to as "the Philippine 
financial system." The total real assets of the financial system had been growing fairly well in 
the early 1980s until an economy-wide crisis struck in 1984 and 1985 (Figure 6). The total real 
assets plunged from P96 billion in 1983 to P45 billion in 1986 as a result of high inflation rates 
and capital flight. Although these recovered in 1987, total real assets of the financial system in 
1988 were still far below the 1983 level 
The financial system has two major sub-systems: the banking system and the non-bank 
financial system. The main difference between the two is that banking institutions are licensed to 
accept deposits, while those belonging to the non-banking financial system cannot. As of 
December 1988, both systems had about the same number of outlets (Table 6)4. Qn the average, 
four outlets can be found in each municipality/city in the country. However, outlets tended to 
congregate in Metro Manila, which is considered as the financial capital of the country. In assets, 
the banking system clearly dominated the financial landscape, contributing 72 percent of the total 
assets of the financial system in 1988 (Table 7). 
4: This excludes offshore banking unite and representative offices of foreign banks. 
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Figure 6 
Resources of Financial and Commercial Banking Systems, Real 
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Table 7 
Assets of the Financial System 
31 December 1988 
(in billion pesos) 
Amount 
(billion P) 
% 
Banking system 360.1 72.0 
Commercial banks 299.3 59.8 
Private 224.6 44.9 
Government 38.8 7.8 
Foreign 35.9 7.2 
Thrift banks 24.9 5.0 
Savings & mortgage banks 14.2 2.8 
Private development banks 6.7 1.3 
Stock savings & loan associations 4.0 0.8 
Rural banks 10.7 2.1 
Specialized government banks 25.2 5.0 
Nonbank financial intermediaries 140.2 28.0 
===z= = = = = 
Insurance companies 98.3 19.6 
Government 68.6 13.7 
Private 29.7 5.9 
Investment institutions 21.4 4.3 
Financing companies 7.4 1.5 
Investment companies 5.6 1.1 
Investment houses 8.4 1.7 
Trust operations (fund managers) 1.8 0.4 
Other financial intermediaries 18.7 3.7 
T o t a l 500.3 100.0 
Memo item: GNP 822.7 
% of GNP 60.8 
Sources: Philippine Financial Fact Book, 1988. 
Insurance Commission (for data on insurance 
companies in 1988). 
Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating 
Committee for assets of the Social Security 
System and Government Social Insurance System 
in 1988. 
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The commercial banking system. Within the banking system, the commercial banking system 
appears to be the biggest sub-system. Its assets comprised 60 percent of the total assets of the 
financial system in 1988. Being national banks, commercial banks (KBs) have the most 
extensive branching network in the countiy. 
The financial system suffered three major crises since 1970, and the commercial banking 
system was not spared of these crises. Hie crisis in 1984-85 was by far the severest of them all. 
Between 1970 and 1987, six KBs floundered. As may be seen from Figure 6, the real assets of 
the commercial banking system sharply dropped from P62 billion in 1983 to P32 billion in 1986. 
While the system has been on the road to recovery since 1987, it will definitely take a long time 
before it can regain the 1983 level. 
Since its establishment in 1949, the CB introduced a number of financial reforms to address 
the weaknesses of the banking system. The most important reforms were introduced in 1980. 
They paved the way for the creation of the so-called "universal banks." These are KBs that are 
allowed to perform investment functions. They may own other financial institutions, except 
other KBs where their ownership is limited to 30 percent. Their required minimum capital is 
P500 million. 
The current structure of the commercial banking system is presented in Table 8. Of the 29 
operating KBs, nine are universal banks, 16 are ordinary KBs, and four are branches of foreign 
banks. Assets of universal banks constituted 60 percent, ordinary KBs constituted 28 percent, 
and branches of foreign banks constituted 12 percent of the total assets of the KB system in 1988. 
A universal bank has both commercial banking and investment banking functions, while an 
ordinary KB cannot perform investment banking. The former has a higher minimum capital 
requirement of P500 thousand; the latter has only a P300 thousand requirement. 
One feature of the KB system is the presence of a large government-owned commercial bank, 
the Philippine National Bank (PNB). It has remained the biggest in terms of total assets even 
when its assets were already reduced by a half in 1986 as a result of the transfer of its 
non-performing assets to the national government The government started privatizing PNB by 
successfully selling 30 percent of its total outstanding shares in June 1989. 
Financing foreign trade is the sole domain of KBs. They are allowed to open foreign and 
domestic letters of credits (LCs) and have swap arrangement with the CB. In the 1970s, all KBs 
were granted the authority to operate a foreign currency deposit unit (FCDU). This was aimed 
primarily at widening the access of the country to foreign currency funds, gaining familiarity 
with foreign investors, and exposing domestic corporations to the foreign market, thereby 
enabling the country to compete in the international capital markets. Some domestic KBs have 
overseas offices, which may be categorized into fully operating branches, agencies, and 
representative offices. They tend to concentrate in countries where trade and investment flows 
with the Philippines are substantial. Only PNB has a branch in Singapore, while two private 
domestic banks maintain only a representative office in the same country (Table 9). None of the 
domestic banks has an overseas office in Asean countries other than Singapore. This may reflect 
the small volume of trade and investments or the restrictive banking policies in Asean countries. 
Banking policies and regulations in the Philippines will be discussed below. 
Table 8 
Total Assets of Individual Commercial Banks 
(in million pesos) 
Total 
Bank Group and Name Assets 
Commercial Banks (P million) 299,227 
A. Government universal bank 38,758 
1.PNB 38,758 
B. Total private universal banks 141,709 
2. Allied 9,470 
3. BPI 26,280 
4. Citytrust 8,098 
5. Equitable 8,190 
6. Far East 28,093 
7. Metrobank 25,729 
8. PCIB 19,676 
9. UCPB 16,173 
Total universal banks 180,467 
C. Total ordinary commercial banks 82,848 
10. Associated 2,518 
11. Boston Bank 2,150 
12. China Bank 6,015 
13. Interbank 7,274 
14. PBCom 5,010 
15. Philbanking 3,699 
16. Philtrust 3,938 
17. Pilipinas 1,425 
18. Producers 3,121 
19. Prudential 7,879 
20. Republic Planters 7,604 
21.RCBC 11,169 
22. Security 4,666 
23. Solidbank 8,837 
24. Traders 3,853 
25. Union 3,690 
Total Private Domestic Banks 224,557 
D. Branches of foreign banks 35,912 
26. Bank of America 8,868 
27. Std. Chartered 429 
28. Citibank 2,875 
29. HSBC 377 
Source: Philippine Financial Fact Book, 1988. 
Table 9 
Overseas Offices of Commercial Banks, December 1988 
Typa DataOpanad 
A. Brandiaa 
I.AIkad-B 
2. AJliad - Guam 
3. Alllad- London 
4. BPI Now York 
5. EqiitaU* • Hongkong 
e. Matrefcaak • Gu»m 
7. Matrobank • Nar Yffh 
8. Mamtaank • Tafeai 
0. PCIB-NawYak 
10. PNB - Han^ung 
11. PNB-London 
12. PNB - Now Y«k 
14PNB-Lo.AngaHa 
11/F Bahrain Toaw 
Qovarnmant Avanua 
Manama, SUM a) 
Balnin 
Ground Row, ADA Bldg. 
Agana, Qjam 06810 
131-133 Cannon S i 
London, EC4N58L 
En0and 
805 3id Annua 
Naw York, Naw York 
No. 4 Duddsla SL 
CanM Hongkong 
OCK Bldg , 414 Watt 
Sdadad Aainiat Agana Qvmee&O 
O n WofW T n d i Cvntv 
Su*»17(n, Naw York City 
10040, USA 
52 Nanking East Road, 
Sacton 1, Taipaf, 
Stita4621 
Ona Worid Ttada Cantor 
NM York City 
10048, USA 
2nd fcw,M%«* Bldg. 
100-116 Quaan* Road 
Can** Hongkong 
103 Cannon a. 
Undon, EC4NSAD, 
SWoddTiadaCaiur 
Naw YoikCtty 
10048, USA 
700 SL riann at 
Sil»2S1« 
00-28-81 
01-02-80 
07-01-85 
09-1S-63 
00-15-63 
06-15-78 
08-30-70 
1. PC1B * Loo Angoloo 
2.PNB-HcnoMu 
Worid TradaCantir 
350 Soulfo Rguma 
Loa Angdaa, Ci lcni ia 
00071, USA 
M I o o r . B M n p T n M 
100 GithapsL, Handuhj 
HawaA 06813, USA 
10-16-7» 
00-01-70 
C. R i p t M i M t O i M 
I . M a 
2. SolidBai* 'svp. - Hongkong 
3. Marabaiik - Hon^iong 
4. Mavobank • Sngapera 
5. Motrabaidi - Tokyo 
8. PCIB - ftankkat 
7. PNB*Ayadh 
8 . U C P 0 - P n 
Sufta 1106, IM i l ae r 
ShaMonHoma 
SfcaMoaW* 
06-30-81 
1502Wovfd-VMdaHouaa 
10 Daa Vaa* Road 
CanM Hongkong 
15th floor, Unit 0 
05 Q j — m , Hongkong 
10301 Marin Plaza 
Slngapon 
Tokyo, Japan 
6th *oor,FBC Bldg. 
kWnMr, l i n d i ^ f l N 4604,000 FniMitAMM: 
G«many 
P A B o 94366 
Hyadh, Saud Anbia 
28 (too Bayard 
Pada, F r a n 
12-15-72 
01-01-82 
08-05-83 
10-06-81 
04-0342 
Sowea:C8 Fact Book, n i o u a yarn 
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The offshore banking system (OBS). The OBS is a newly created sub-system of the financial 
sector It is a mechanism for the country to have more and better access to funds of international 
financial markets through the participation of foreign financial institutions. The success of 
Singapore's OBS encouraged the Philippine government to restructure the foreign currency 
deposit system. Thus, the foreign currency banking setup is now comprised of two sectors: the 
foreign currency deposit units and the offshore banking units (OBUs). 
Since the system was implemented, the number of OBUs increased rapidly, reaching 26 in 
1983. But some of them lost interest in continuing their operations here as a result of the 
1984-85 economic crisis. As of December 1988, 21 OBUs were still actively operating. One of 
them is the International Bank of Singapore which has been in the country since 1977. Apart 
from it, no other OBU is owned by any of the other Asean countries. 
The growth in OBS assets in the first few years was phenomenal. From US$757 million in 
1977, assets went up to US$5 billion in 1982, exceeding the expectations of the authorities. In 
the following year, however, a BOP crisis struck the economy. The Philippines declared a 
moratorium on payments of external debts. As expected, the volume of OBS business declined 
sharply. By September 1989, total OBS assets stood only at US$2.7 billion. Most of the OBS 
loans are short-term, i.e., one year or less. 
Most of the OBS resources were lent onshore, either directly to non-bank customers or to 
domestic KBs, which in turn lent the funds to domestic non-bank customers (Table 10). Almost 
all of these funds came from outside the Philippines. Thus, the inflow of foreign capital through 
the OBS supplemented the meager supply of domestic capital. 
The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The DBP was created by the government 
primarily to provide long-term funds to agriculture and industry. It was also given the task of 
promoting the establishment of private development banks through direct equity participation. 
DBP's role was purely developmental. Unlike PNB, it did not compete with private KBs in 
mobilizing deposits. It mainly relied on subsidies from the government, deposits of government 
corporations notably the Government Social Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security 
System (SSS), and foreign loans which were earmarked for special projects. On the lending side, 
it concentrated on financing long-gestating projects such as steel, cement, shipping, and mining 
that were deemed crucial to the economic development of the country but which required huge 
financial outlays. It also provided guarantees to several foreign loans contracted by private 
corporations. In the early 1980s, it was heavily involved in rehabilitating private financial 
institutions by either infusing fresh capital or lending to ailing financial institutions. 
DBP used to be the second largest financial institution in the country next to PNB. Between 
1980 and 1985, its total assets more than doubled from P27 billion to P72 billion (Table 11). But 
this only masked the real problems of DBP. The proportion of foreign borrowing to total 
long-term borrowing markedly increased during the 1983-84 BOP crisis as a result of the sharp 
devaluation of the peso against the dollar. DBP's problems became more pronounced in 1984 
when it suffered a substantial loss of P6.6 billion. Most of the behest and guaranteed loans 
turned sour. DBP ended up haggling non-performing assets. Huge losses went on for three 
consecutive years totalling P17.9 billion. In 1986, DBP underwent a rehabilitation program that 
Table 10 
Philippine Offshore Banking System Statement of Assets 
and Liabilities, September 1989 
Items US$Millk>n 
Assets 
Notes and coins on hand 0 
Due from banks 1,506 
Outside the Philippines 359 
In the Philippines 1,147 
Loans and discounts to customers 
other than banks 1,096 
Non-residents 115 
Residents 9fi1 
Public sector 481 
Private sector 500 
Bills discounted/purchased 1 
Non-residents 0 
Residents 0 
Investment in bonds and 
other securities 28 
Non-residents 20 
Residents 8 
All other assets 86 
Interest receivable 40 
Non-residents 8 
Residents 32 
Other assets in the 
Philippines 45 
Other assets outside 
the Philippines 1 
Total assets 2,717 
Less: Allowance for probable 
losses 20 
Total assets after allowance 
for losses 2,697 
Liabilities 
Deposit of non-residents 
other than banks 40 
Due to banks 2,554 
Outside the Philippines 2,205 
In the Philippines 349 
Other liabilities 103 
Interest payable 37 
Non-residents 33 
Residents 4 
In the Philippines 31 
Outside the Philippines 35 
Total liabilities 2,697 
Source: Foreign Exchange Regulations Department, 
Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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involved the transfer to the national government of its non- performing assets totalling P61.4 
billion and certain liabilities and related accounts amounting to P62.2 billion. This drastically 
reduced DBP's total assets to P9.5 billion in 1986. 
In 1989, DBP resumed its normal lending operations. It is currently trying to reestablish 
itself as the primary development lending institution in the country minus the previous practice of 
accommodating behest loans and indiscriminately providing guarantees on privately contracted 
foreign loans. Government subsidies to DBP are being gradually phased out But it still remains 
the major conduit of externally funded special credit programs such as the Industrial Guarantee 
Loan Fund. 
The insurance system. Like banking, the insurance business was formally introduced by 
foreigners into the country in the 19th century. The first domestic, privately owned life insurance 
company was established only in 1910. The GSIS, a social security system for government 
employees, was established in 1937; the SSS, a social security system for employees in the 
private sector, was established in 1957. 
Although part of the financial system, the insurance system falls outside the purview of CB 
regulations. It is supervised and regulated by a separate body, the Insurance Commission, which 
reports to the Department of Finance. The importance of the insurance system may be gauged by 
its share in the total assets of the financial system that already reached 20 percent as of December 
1988 (Table 7), representing 135 insurance companies, of which 131 were privately owned. 
Thirteen were owned by non-residents. Private insurance companies may be classified into life, 
non-life, composite of life and non-life, and reinsurer (Table 12). Non-life insurance companies 
dominate the system as duly registered institutions. One reinsurance corporation is owned by all 
the insurance companies in the Philippines including the government-owned GSIS. 
The ratio of premium expenditure to GNP is the measure commonly used to evaluate the size 
of national insurance markets. In the Philippines, this ratio reached 1.56 percent in 1987, which 
was the highest among Asean countries5. But this is low by international standards. USA, Japan, 
West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Korea had ratios ranging from 5 to 9 percent in the 
same year. 
Between 1978 and 1987, total assets of the insurance system increased more than four-fold 
(Jable 13). The government insurance companies, dominated by GSIS and SSS, contributed 
between 63 percent to 72 percent of the total assets of the insurance system during the same 
period. Table 14 presents the shares in total assets of private domestic and foreign-owned 
insurance companies by type of insurance companies, as of December 1987. The table shows 
that the shares of foreign-owned insurance companies in total assets are relatively small in all 
types of insurance companies. 
Table 15 provides the consolidated balance sheet of private insurance companies as of 
December 1987. In general, stocks, bonds, and short-term investments were the most popular 
5. The ratio for the other ASEAN countries are: Indonesia: .40 percent, Malaysia: 1.35 percent, Singapore: 1.18 percent, 
and Thailand: .72 percent 
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Table 14 
Admitted Assets of Insurance Companies Authorized to 
Operate in the Philippines, by Type of Ownership, 
as of 31 December 1987 (in million pesos) 
Percentage 
Admitted to 
Insurance Companies Assets Total 
Life companies 
I. Domestic - life 12,685.85 50.00 
II. Foreign - life 1,692.39 6.67 
Total domestic & foreign life 14,378.24 56.67 
Non-life companies 
I. Domestic - non-Jife 8,278.03 32.63 
II. Foreign - non-life 1,804.94 7.11 
Total domestic & foreign non-life 10,082.97 39.74 
Professional reinsurers 
I. Domestic reinsurers 825.95 3.26 II. Foreign reinsurers 85.62 0.34 
Total domestic & foreign reinsurers 911.57 3.59 
G r a n d T o t a l 25,372.79 100.00 
Source: Insurance Commission Annual Report, 1988. 
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Table 15 
Consolidated Balance Sheet 
Private Insurance Companies 
31 December 1987 
N o n - I l i a 
Domaatic Foraign 
n 
TcM D 
tifeaaioiitf F 
omaaMc F 
ainaunia 
xalgn Total )omaatlc 
Ua 
Tori T«M 
AdiniBad Bsub 
Bondt 368.5 407.1 776.8 14.8 7,7 225 2,305.8 317* 2 , 0 2 * 3421* 
Stoda 1,0813 80.8 1.16M 48.7 3.6 50.3 2,888.3 a u 2*27* 4,ia8* 
Raal aatata ownad 433,9 440.5 4.1 4.1 844.1 • 844.1 1*88.7 
Purohaaa monay mcrt^ QQ* 0.5 - 05 > 14* - 14* 14.7 
Mortgaga loana on tad aattta 63.4 2.8 662 OS - 05 737* • >37* 804* 
Coflataral loan* 8.0 . 8.0 0.8 - 0.8 177* 8* 18a* 1894 
Guanrtaad loana 38.1 . 38.1 - - 698.7 284* 9438 862.1 
Policy l o w - - - - - 1*914 1885 T.0499 
Other loons 12.0 0.2 12* 0.8 • 88 196.1 4j8 208.1 213.1 
GherMvm invHttntnt 1,801.1 308.8 1,507.7 33.0 5.8 38l8 1,764.4 584.7 2*28.1 3*75.7 
Security fund 3,7 0.5 4 * 8.3 0.1 0.4 4 * 0 * S.1 8.7 
Other iiwtftliiitiH 68* 2.1 71.3 4.0 « 4.8 188.8 Oil iae.7 216* 
Cut) on hand and In bank* ees.e 115.1 eoc.s 18.3 21.1 40.4 888* 13* 1*24* 
445.5 75.8 521.3 * 921* 
Uh inwnne* pramimn and 
anmity coreidarafona unctdaoad . 182* 28* 221* 221* 
Qua from cad no ccnjsariaa 1*66.8 388.8 1.835.7 2 9 4 * 29 S 278.7 14* - 14* 1*284 
ftamiuiB/lOB n w v M trithhald by 
eadlng onpanlaa 317* 50.2 387.7 203* - 203* 27* * 27* 9 8 6 * 
Aeddant and haahh pnmlum duo 
and uncoflectod - - 8.6 6 * 6* 
Rainsuanco ncomnfel* on IOUH 1,708.3 300.4 2,008.7 234.7 2.3 237.0 2*49.7 
Ottiar rainauianca accounts ncaiwfelo 90* 8.3 585 - * 96* 
ConHriealom/accountB/notoa noaivabto 345.7 288 372* 7.8 - 7,8 - - - 380* 
Salvaga raowanfala 45 3 . 45.3 . . 4 5 * 
Acauad IMWHt and athar 
Inwalmantlneoma 48.8 184 68.3 0.8 0.8 14 178* 2&0 2 0 2 5 272* 
Odwaaaatt 82.0 33.7 115.7 188 18.9 28.8 187* &8 173J8 388* 
TcM adnttad aaaaa 8*78.0 1,804.8 10,082-8 8M.7 85.7 811.8 12£85* 1,8824 14*78* 29*72.7 
I M M M 
mmmmmmm • • » — * * " * wmmmm 
Raaaivaa for unaamad pwriuma 772.7 281.1 1,0636 BAB 15.3 85.1 _ m 1 , 1 4 8 * 
Lagal pdiey raaaivaa 7 4 9 0 * 8 8 4 * 7 * 5 9 . 1 7 * 9 8 . 1 
Policy and contract dairtw - - - 1 F L 7 * 1 8 8 1 8 8 / 4 1 ( 6 4 
Lossas and dama payabla 1,884.3 820.4 2,413.7 337.8 337.9 '. * - - 2,751* 
Loaa adjuatmant aipanaaa Z7.1 18.8 87.8 • - - 37* 
DMdanda payatla to atockhsldar 1.0 1.0 « 16* - T E * 1 7 * 
Potcytioidart' Svidanda - - - 2 3 4 8 29011 4 6 8 * 4 8 4 * 
Prarriums and annuity conaidanton 
raoavadlnadvana . 37* - 37* 3 7 * 
LiiMlaa for pramium dapoalt . 74* 0 * 74* 
Pnniumt dtw to raiMuara 1*473.1 173.3 1*48.4 175.0 0.8 175.8 7 7 * A I 7 7 * 1 * 8 8 * 
ftafriumafaaa raaan* vMitiold 
forrainauara 411.0 131.8 5 4 2 8 85.8 5 * 1008 2 * 2 * 6 4 6 * 
Othar ralmurano* aeaunta poytMa 81.8 72.8 1 8 4 . 4 1.3 * 1.3 • - 1 3 6 . 7 
Taias/Koansa* payaUo 231.8 185 2 5 1 4 3.1 0 * 3* 40.7 1 0 * 51* 816* 
Acouod axpantat payabla 59.4 4.0 56.4 2.8 2.8 . . 62* 
Camndaalona and ottiar dtwgaa poyafela 211.8 25.0 2388 « 0 * 0* 97* 8 7 8 3 . 7 308* 
AceaunlBAiotaapqratta 158.8 15 161* 28.8 208 7M 0.1 78* 261* 
Unaamad invaatmana Incema • - . 485 1 * 48.7 48.7 
Othar Rabtttiaa 645 20.6 85.1 5.1 4.7 8.8 357.4 188* 946* 641* 
TctalWMaa 5,358.0 1,280.8 6,638.9 711* 28* 737.4 8£64* 1 , 3 4 0 . 7 8^805* 16*78* 
NatwanMuattd auftua" 
Paid-ip captolMakitory dapotita' 1,020.8 110.1 1,131.0 97.2 1S.0 72* 780* 280 7 8 6 * 1*88.7 
Paid-in capital in aioaa el par vtfu* 7 * 24 " 8L8 - 0.8 1 * . 1 * 10* 
CortrSwM avjf tn 154.2 77.8 236.6 82 82 82.7 51* 1 8 4 * 380* 
liwaatmant fluctuation taaaiva 7345 134.8 aw* 65 . 85 1*83* 8 * 1 * 6 6 . 7 2,744* 
Aialgnad surplus 19.6 18.8 . 0.0 8.1 - 8.1 27.7 
Unaatlgnad surpluaAioma offica account** 883* 189.1 1,182.7 3&8 44.5 84.3 1,789.7 278.7 1*784 8*484 
Total natmoith 2,825.0 524.0 3/448.0 114.7 M S 174* 4 , 4 2 1 5 351.7 4,773* 8 * 8 8 4 
ToMlaMMttt td 
notnolMiMad awplua* 6,278.0 1*04.8 10,082.9 825.8 ffi.7 811.8 12*89* 1 , 8 8 2 4 14*78* 29*79.7 
Soifei: iMurane* Gomntettan Annual Rtport, 1888. 
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investment instruments of insurance companies. Policy loans also appeared to be an important 
investment instrument of life insurance companies. A more detailed breakdown of investments 
in bonds by private insurance companies is presented in Table 16. Government securities 
dominated the investment portfolio of insurance companies. Among government securities, 
treasury notes and the high-yielding treasury bills were the most important investment 
instruments of insurance companies. Investment in private corporate bonds was very small. 
Note, however, that the supply of private corporate bonds in the domestic market was also 
minimal. 
Table 17 gives the investment profile of government insurance companies. GSIS investment 
portfolio appeared to be well-diversified, whereas that of SSS concentrated in bonds. 
Government securities were the most important investment outlet of government insurance 
companies. 
The analysis above shows the importance of the insurance system in generating financial 
resources and financing the budget deficit of the national government. 
The Securitized Capital Market 
The securitized capital market provides medium- and long-term funds by issuing instruments 
that are negotiable. It is divided into the primary market and the secondary market. The 
Philippine primary market has remained thin and unimportant in providing medium- and 
long-term funds. The secondary market, on the other hand, grew fairly well over the 1970s and 
1980s. However, it remains narrow compared with those of Singapore and Malaysia. It is 
dominated by the stock market. 
Two stock exchanges exist in the country. The Manila Stock Exchange was established in the 
1920s. It currently has 65 members and 229 listed issues. The Makati Stock Exchange, on the 
other hand, was organized only in the mid-1960s. It also has 65 members. Both exchanges have 
identical listings of stocks because of the law that requires automatic listing in both stock 
exchanges of securities approved for listing and trading. More issues are listed than there are 
companies because of the regulation that Class A shares can only be owned by Filipinos while 
Class B shares can be owned by both Filipinos and foreigners. However, no difference exists 
between the two classes as far as voting rights, dividend rights, or any other rights of 
stockholders. The distinction is made to facilitate identifying an issue's foreign ownership base 
because of the regulation that foreign ownership of a corporation is limited to a maximum of 40 
percent Apparently, this has led to the distortion in the prices of the shares since there always 
has been excess demand on class B shares. Now a move toward merging the two stock 
exchanges and doing away with two classes of shares is taking place. 
Like the rest of the financial system, the stock market was not spared of the recent economic 
crisis. In fact, its problem started as early as 1981 when a liquidity crisis struck the financial 
system. It started to recover when the economy bounced back in 1986 (Table 18) and local and 
foreign investors made a comeback. The current profile of market players is given as follows: 
local institutional investors - 40 percent, resident individuals - 37 percent, and foreign investors -
23 percent 
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Table 18 
Manila/Makati Stock Exchange Trading, 1975-1988 
(in billion shares/pesos) 
Manila 
Volume Value 
Makati 
Volume Value 
1975 58.4 1.5 57 1.6 
1976 128 3.4 120 3.4 
1977 63 1.2 66 1.3 
1978 70 2.5 83 2.9 
1979 56 2.3 74 2.7 
1980 40 2.1 61 2.6 
1981 20 0.6 32 0.7 
1982 21 0.7 20 0.5 
1983 17 3.4 20 2.0 
1984 9 0.7 15 1.4 
1985 7 1.6 5 0.5 
1986 38 8.4 21 3.1 
1987 208 19.3 107 12.1 
1988 142 10.1 80 8.2 
Source: Annual Reports of Manila and Makati Stock Exchanges 
(various years). 
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Impact of the Current Financial and Banking Structure on Asean Cooperation 
The Philippine financial system is less fragmented now than before. The 1980 financial 
deregulations, particularly the broadening of the functions and the reduction in the functional 
distinction among different types of banks, have encouraged consolidation and mergers. Banks 
have either set up new departments to take on additional functions or have created or bought 
subsidiaries. As a result, there is better coordination in the system. Moreover, the 1984-85 BOP 
crisis led to the collapse of weaker and badly managed financial institutions. Thus, only relatively 
strong financial institutions have remained in the system. Also, practically the same set of 
regulations apply to all types of banks. 
A strong and well-coordinated financial system is in a better position to promote intra-Asean 
cooperation. For instance, any discussion about cooperation in the securities market will likely 
be participated in or strongly supported by leading financial institutions in the country since they 
have subsidiaries operating in this submarket. 
Representation will be less of a problem because of reduced functional distinctions among 
different types of financial institutions. Representatives to an Asean forum will, therefore, have a 
larger view of cooperation since they will be thinking of their impact on the entire system. For 
instance, cooperative efforts in the thrift banking system will be seen in the context of how they 
will affect the rest of the financial system. 
There are indications, however, that the present structure of the financial system could 
hamper Asean cooperation. This is particularly true in areas where competitive position of 
financial institutions will be reduced. For instance, allowing other Asean countries to enter in 
one particular submarket will likely meet strong resistance from all sectors within the financial 
system. Thus, cooperation within the region will likely be limited to parallel activities such as 
training, sharing of information, and policy coordination, but never in areas where improvement 
in microeconomic efficiency is needed. 
V. LINKAGES BETWEEN THE REAL AND FINANCIAL SECTORS 
OF THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY 
It is said that the real and financial sectors of the economy are two faces of the same coin. 
They are closely linked to each other through various avenues. The strength of the linkage 
through certain means would differ, of course, across countries because such linkage depends on 
what sub-sectors of the real and financial sectors have been developed. This section analyzes the 
extent of the linkage between the real and financial sectors of the Philippine economy. The 
Annual Macroeconometric Model: Version 1989 of the Philippine Institute of Development 
Studies (PIDS) and the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which was 
developed by Constantino, et al. (1990), was used in analyzing the structure of the Philippine 
economy. The model is based on a combination of classical, Keynesian, structuralist, and 
monetarist models. 
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The model has four major blocks: 1) the real sector consisting of production, expenditure and 
employment, wages, and prices; 2) the fiscal sector, 3) the financial sector; and 4) the external 
sector. It uses 114 behavioral equations and 53 identities. The financial sector alone has a total 
of 22 equations of which 15 are behavioral equations. 
In this study, two experiments were conducted covering the period 1977-1987: The values of 
two variables in the financial sector, i.e., the treasury bill rate and the reserve requirement ratio on 
deposit liabilities, were changed and their short- and long-run impact on all the four major blocks 
were traced. For purposes of this study, only the results of a few variables will be presented. 
Increase in the Treasury Bill Rate 
The treasury bill rate was increased by 10 percent The effects of this shock on key variables 
are shown in Table 19. Total liquidity increases by 3.2 percent in the short run and by 9.2 
percent in the long run. The reason is that an increase in the Treasury bill rate raises the net 
credit of the CB to the national government. Since the latter is a component of the monetary 
base, the increase ultimately expands total liquidity through the reserve money multiplier 
equation. The inflationary pressure created adversely affects the real sector of the economy. In 
particular, GNP declines by 0.29 percent in the short run and by 3.7 percent in the long run. 
Among the various components of demand, durable equipment will be hardest hit Among the 
major production sectors, agriculture will not be adversely affected by an increase in the Treasury 
bill rate since loans to the rural banks, which mainly provide credit to the agricultural sector, will 
increase with an increase in total liquidity6. Trade balance considerably improves in the long run 
since demand is dampened. 
Increase in Reserve Requirement 
In this experiment, the reserve requirement ratio on deposit liabilities of banks was increased 
by 10 percent The results are shown in Table 20. Total liquidity is reduced by 2.6 percent in the 
short run and by 16.7 percent in the long run. This is because an increase in the reserve 
requirement ratio lessens the value of the money multiplier. The reduction in total liquidity 
decreases the consumer price index by 0.44 percent in the short run and by 6.44 percent in the 
long run. The overall impact of an increase in the reserve requirement ratio on the real sector is 
positive. GNP improves by 0.03 percent in the short run and by 2.08 percent in the long run. 
The short run impact however, varies among the demand components. Personal consumption 
and durable equipment will be adversely affected in the short-run while the rest of the demand 
components will be positively affected. Among the major production sectors, agriculture will 
suffer both in the short and the long run. The reason is that an increase in reserve requirement 
reduces total liquidity which, in turn, reduces total loans to the rural banking system, a major 
provider of credit to the agricultural sector. Trade balance also improves in the second 
experiment, although the improvement is much less than that of the first experiment. In overall 
performance, the second experiment produces better results than the first experiment 
6. In the Philippines, rural banks were heavily dependent on borrowing from the CB for their lending activities to the 
agricultural sector for most of the period covered in the study. 
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Table 19 
Impact, Terminal, and Average Percent Differences for 
Selected Variables, 1977-87: Ten Percent Increase 
in Treasury Bill Rate, Sustained Shock 
Variable Impact Terminal Average 
Gross National Product -0 .2900 -3 .6730 -2 .0631 
Personal Consumption -0 .2299 -3 .2443 -1 .7176 
Government Consumption -0 . 1327 -4 .4422 -3 .4152 
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation -0 .7812 -8. .0398 -5 .0080 
Private Construction -0 .3988 -4 .3829 -2 .4581 
Public Construction -0 . 3343 -4 .7777 -2 .9343 
Durable Equipment -1 .5337 -15 .0090 -8' .4201 
Exports -0 .9938 -1 .8683 -1 .0754 
Imports -0, .2752 -4 , . 3256 -2 .6677 
Gross Domestic Product -0, . 2926 -3. . 6779 -2 .0696 
Agriculture -0 . 0115 0. .0834 0. .0033 
Industry -0. . 5456 -6 . 9965 -3. .7683 
Manufacturing -0, .5213 -6 . 1810 -3 , .4016 
Services -0. .2456 -3. 5588 -1. .9977 
Consumer Price Index 0. , 5506 3 . 7080 2 . 8555 
Total Liquidity 3. 1789 9. 2365 7. 3897 
Budget Deficit 3 . 6252 5. 9926 275. 4884 
Revenues -0 . 5453 -1. 7529 -1. 5036 
Trade Balance 0, 9852 11. 1850 54. 3019 
Exports -0. 0992 -2. 1785 -1. 2108 
Imports -0. 2786 -4 . 1042 -2. 3577 
Balance of Payments 11. 4906 37. 9650 24. 4520 
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Table 20 
Impact, Terminal, and Average Percent Differences for Selected 
Variables, 1977-1987: Ten Percent Increase in Reserve 
Requirements, Sustained Shock 
Variable Impact Terminal Average 
Gross National Product 0. 0316 2. 0847 0. 9060 
Personal Consumption -0. 1051 0. 7395 0. 2596 
Government Consumption 0. 1056 6. 5634 2. 9524 
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation 0. 0375 3. 6686 1. 6127 
Private Construction 0. 2276 4. 0211 1. 9448 
Public Construction 0. 2664 7. 9435 3. 9838 
Durable Equipment -1. 1763 2. 4761 0. 4140 
Exports 0. 0684 2. 9107 1. 3163 
Imports 0. 0142 1. 3834 0. 6976 
Gross Domestic Product 0. 0325 2. 1243 0. 9434 
Agriculture -0. 1043 -2. 6827 1. 2066 
Industry 0. 1451 6. 0118 2. 5720 Manufacturing 0. 1010 5. 1504 2. 1507 
Services 0. 0199 2. 2377 0. 9783 
Consumer Price Index -0. 4364 -6. 4397 -3. 7730 
Total Liquidity -2. 6026 -16. 6620 -10. 9451 
Budget Deficit 1. 5638 8. 4904 1030. 5697 
Revenues -0. 2476 -2. 4693 -1. 4466 
Trade Balance 0. 1939 5. 8141 13. 9207 
Exports 0. 0661 3. 3513 1. 4529 Imports 0. 0139 1. 3771 0. 6293 
Balance of Payments 1. 8213 17. 1270 9. 7505 
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To recapitulate, we have examined the linkage of the real and financial sectors of the 
economy using an econometric model. The model itself tries to capture the relationships among 
various sectors of the economy. The results suggest a strong linkage between the real and 
financial sectors of the economy. It implies that an appropriate monetary policy can help steer 
the course of the economy. 
VI. POLICY MEASURES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING 
FINANCIAL FLOWS BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND ASEAN 
In general, the Philippines does not discriminate Asean from non- Asean countries in its 
policies governing financial transactions between residents and non-residents. Thus, the same 
regulations are applied to transactions between the Philippines and Asean countries, and between 
the Philippines and non-Asean countries. Transactions that involve the use of foreign exchange, 
either through the current or capital account, are heavily regulated. Transactions that involve 
inflows of foreign exchange are less regulated than those that involve outflows. 
On merchandise trade, the Philippines has been regulating imports, although trade has been 
liberalized in the 1980s. In 1980, importation of 2,032 items was regulated, banned, or 
prohibited. By January 1990, the number of regulated, banned, or prohibited items went down to 
441. Banks are prohibited from selling foreign exchange to importers who wish to import those 
included in the list of banned or prohibited items; thus, importers have to seek clearance from 
concerned government agencies before they are allowed to secure foreign currency from banks. 
For non-trade (invisibles) foreign exchange transactions, Section 39 of CB Circular No. 960 
states that ~ 
No person, firm, association or corporation shall take or transmit or attempt to take or 
transmit foreign exchange, in any form, in any manner, out of the Philippines directly or 
through other person, through mails, or through international carriers unless specifically 
authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or Central 
Bank regulations; Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to tourists and non-resident 
temporary visitors who are taking or sending out of the Philippines foreign exchange in 
amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in and declared by them. 
The specific regulations covering the sale of foreign exchange requiring prior CB approval is 
presented in Appendix 2. The long list of regulations and procedures to be followed in procuring 
foreign exchange for non-trade transactions clearly indicates the very restrictive policy of the 
government in this area. There is no doubt that this partly hampers financial flows between the 
Philippines and other Asean countries. 
The Philippines encourages foreign investments into the country. Such investments may take 
the form of direct equity participation in a domestically-registered (or resident) firm, or 
investments in CB-approved securities. There are limits to equity participation by foreigners in a 
resident firm. The Philippine Constitution states that: "The Congress shall, upon recommendation 
of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of 
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is 
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of 
investments" (Article XII, Section 10). Restrictions on foreign equity participation in domestic 
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activities are not uncommon among host less developing countries (LDCs). Among Asean 
countries, Singapore has the least restrictive policy on foreign equity participation, while the 
Philippines has the most restrictive policy (Table 21). 
Restriction on foreign equity participation has certainly affected the free flow of capital into 
the Philippines. This is now seriously felt by the domestic economy, especially at this time when 
it is virtually impossible to obtain foreign loans from the international banking community7. 
Investment growth in the past few years could have been sustained had foreign investments 
accelerated. However, many potential investors wanted to come in only if they were allowed to 
exercise greater control over their assets. Moreover, the lack of local capital for joint venture 
projects requires more investments coming from foreign investors, which means that foreign 
participation could go beyond the 40 percent limit to initiate a project. 
4 
This need to stimulate investment in the domestic economy has led some members of the 
Philippine congress and the executive branch to initiate some moves to relax the rule on foreign 
equity participation. However, they are meeting strong resistance from the so-called "nationalist 
bloc" inside and outside the congress. 
In the Philippines, entry by non-residents into banking is more restrictive than entry into 
non-banking activities. There is currently a moratorium on giving new licenses to branches of 
foreign banks. Only four branches of foreign banks have been allowed to operate since the 
establishment of the CB. They may open up branches in any part of the country, but the new 
branches are not allowed to accept demand deposits. This is one discriminatory policy against 
branches of foreign banks. However, foreign equity participation in domestic banking institutions 
is encouraged up to 30 percent of the total voting stocks of banks. The Monetary Boaid may, 
with the approval of the President of the Philippines, increase the percentage of foreign-owned 
voting stocks in any domestic bank from 30 to 40 percent 
Non-bank financial institutions such as finance companies and insurance companies also have 
the 40 percent limit on foreign equity participation. Asian banks, entry by foreigners into the 
insurance market is restricted. No new branch or subsidiary of foreign insurance companies has 
been established since 1960. 
One way by which non-residents can participate in financial activities is to engage in offshore 
banking activities. Offshore banking refers to banking transactions and operations in foreign 
currencies involving the receipt of funds principally from external sources and the utilization of 
such funds. Only banks organized under any law other than that of the Republic of the 
Philippines, their branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates shall be qualified to operate an OBU in the 
Philippines. Table 22 presents a summary of regulations governing operations of OBUs. Unlike 
in Singapore, the OBS in the Philippines was estabjphed for the purpose of increasing local 
residents' access to foreign currency funds. 
As already mentioned earlier, foreign investors may also invest in CB-approved Philippine 
securities. These refer to securities listed with the Philippine stock exchanges, whether the 
7. There has been a reverse flow of financial resources in the past few years. The net resource transfer to creditors from 1985 
to 1989 already reached US$7.67 billion. A huge chunk of these payments went to commercial banks and institutions. 
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Table 22 
Regulations Governing the Operations 
of OBUs in the Philippines 
Area Regulations 
1. Participating banks 
2. Qualified depositors 
3. Amount of deposit 
4. Types of deposits 
5. Currencies used 
6. Liquidity ratios 
7. Currency trading 
8. Minimum capitalization 
requirement 
9. Securities 
10. Qualified borrowers 
11. Swap operations (foreign 
currency - peso) 
12. Uniform Currency Law 
(RA 529)/Usury Law 
(RA 2655) 
13. Taxation: 
a. 5% gross receipts tax 
(Tax Code, Sec. 249). 
b. documentary and science 
tax. 
c. tax on net income. 
- Branches of foreign banks. 
- a. Resident commercial banks only, 
b. Non-residents. 
- a. For time/call deposits: $50,000 
and above, 
b. For demand deposits: any amount. 
- a. Time/call 
b. Demand 
(There are no savings accounts. 
There are no regulations as to trust 
deposits.) 
- Any foreign currency (for 
transactions with residents only 
reserve currencies or any foreign 
currency freely convertible into 
reserve currencies. The peso is 
used for administrative transact-
ions only.). 
- There is no provision on the cover. 
All that is required is an uncondi-
tional guarantee by the head office 
which suggests, in effect, a 100% 
cover. 
- Foreign exchange trading is allowed 
with no restrictions on what cur-
rency the bank is to hold. 
--•No capitalization requirement. (The 
law simply requires that they hold 
at least US$1 million in deposits 
with the Central Bank or 
investments in Phil, securities or 
other CB-approved assets.) 
- a. Short-term. 
b. Medium-term. 
c. Long-term. 
- a. Residents (subject to Central 
Bank approval), 
b. Non-residents (no Central Bank 
approval needed). 
- 0% (OBUs do not have access to 
pesos; thus there are no swap 
arrangements in pesos) 
Swap with CB, FCDU, OBU (only in 
foreign currencies). 
- Not applicable. 
- - a. Not applicable. 
b. Not applicable. 
c. For net offshore income, the tax 
rate is 5%; for gross onshore 
income, the tax rate is 10%. 
Source: Central Bank Circular No. 960 (1983). 
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principal amount is expressed in Philippine peso or in some other currency. They include 
securities traded or dealt in by accredited government securities dealers. Foreign investments in 
CB- approved Philippine securities funded by inward remittance of foreign exchange should be 
registered with the CB through an authorized agent bank. All commercial banks and banks with 
expanded KBs functions are designated as authorized securities dealers. Any duly licensed 
securities dealer may also secure a certificate of authority from the CB. 
The law on real estate ownership by alien investors in the Philippines also discourages 
foreign investment Hie Philippine Constitution limits the ownership of land and the 
development, exploration, exploitation, and use of natural resources to citizens of the Philippines 
and to corporations or associations with at least 60 percent capital owned by Filipino citizens. As 
shown in Table 23, the Philippines appears to have the most restrictive law on real estate 
ownership by'alien investors in die Asean region. 
Asean countries grant foreign investors almost similar guarantees against expropriation; 
losses due to nationalization, war, and inconvertibility of currency; remittance of foreign 
exchange on earnings, profits, and dividends on investments; remittance of interest and principal 
payments on foreign loans; and repatriation of capital (Table 24). In the Philippines, only 
investments duly registered with the CB, whether in the form of equity or securities, are eligible 
for repatriation and remittances of profits and dividends. Note that only the Philippines has a 
proviso restricting foreign exchange remittance in the event of an emergency situation in the 
foreign exchange market or a BOP crisis. This was invoked in 1983 when the Philippines 
declared a moratorium on the servicing of foreign debts. With the moratorium still fresh in the 
minds of many foreign investors, any sign of a foreign exchange crisis in the Philippines will be 
taken seriously by foreign investors. 
Asean countries also use fiscal incentives to attract foreign investments (Table 24). Except 
for Indonesia, the Asean countries offer investors with income tax holidays. Indonesia and 
Thailand tax capital gains like ordinary income. In analyzing the impact of investment incentives 
on the internal rate of return, Manasan (1988; p. 18) concluded that "Asean countries are to a large 
extent as competitive with one another before incentives as after incentives." 
The Philippines has bilateral tax treaties with Singapore (January 1977), Indonesia (January 
1983), Thailand (January 1983), and Malaysia (January 1985) to avoid double taxation and 
prevent fiscal evasion of taxes on income. For instance, the Philippines and Indonesia concluded 
in 1981 a tax treaty covering the following: for the Philippines, the income taxes imposed by the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines; for Indonesia, the income tax, the company tax, 
and the tax on interest dividend, and royalty. This took effect in 1983. Table 25 gives a 
summary of the Philippines' tax treaty rates on investment income and on shipping and air 
transport 
To recapitulate, the Philippine government has been exerting efforts to encourage foreign 
investments into the country. However, certain domestic policy measures, domestic laws, and 
regulations impede financial flows between the Philippines and the rest of the world, in general, 
and between the Philippines and Asean countries, in particular. Among these are: 1) the 40 
percent limit on foreign equity participation, 2) restrictive law on real estate ownership by alien 
investors, 3) the proviso restricting foreign exchange remittance in the event of an emergency 
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Table 25 
Comparative Presentation of RP Tax Treaty Rates on 
Investment Income and on Shipping and Air Transport 
COUNTRY SINGAPORE : MALAYSIA THAILAND : INDONESIA 
I. TREATY RATES AND RELIEFS 
THEREFROM ON INVESTMENT 
INCOME 
Date of EFFECTIVITY/SIGNING/ 
CONCLUSION E-01/01/77 E-01/01/85 E-01/01/83 E-01/01/83 
D I V I D E N D S 
Inter-Corporate Relief 
BOI (Pioneer) Relief 
Ordinary Relief 
15% C,DPC,TS 
25% CJS 
15% C.DPC ,TS-RP 
EX-M 
25% C.TS-RP 
EX-M 
15%-RP,20%-T 
C.DPCJS 
15%-TCJS 
15% CJS 
20% CJS 
B R A N C H P R O F I T S 1/ 
Relief • 10% CJS - 20% CJS 
I N T E R E S T 
Derived by govt relief 
Loans guaranrd/lnsured by 
gov't relief 
Public Bond Issues Relief 
Ordinary Relief 
Special Cases Relief 
Exempt 
10% CJS 
15% CJS 
Exempt 
15% CJS 
OK loans -Ex 
Exempt 
10%-RP CJS 
15%-RP,25%-T 
CJS 
10%-T 2/ 
CJS 
Exempt 
Exempt 
10% CJS 
15% CJS 
15% CJS 
R O Y A L T I E S 
BOI Pioneer Relief 
Cinema Rims Relief 
Ordinary Relief 
15% C JS-RP 
Ex-S 
15% C JS-RP 
25% CJS 
15% C JS-RP 
Ex-M 
Ex-M 
25%-RP,15%-M 
CJS 
15% CJS 
15% CJS 
25% CJS 
15% CJS 
25%-RP,15%-i 
CJS 
II. TAXATION OF SHIPPING and AIR 
TRANSPORT 
Rate (%) 
Relief 
1 1/2MFN 
CJS 
1 1/2MFN 
CJS 
1 1/2MFN 3/ 
CJS 
1 1/2 MFN 
CJS 
LEGEND: 
1. C - Ordinary foreign tax credit 
2. c - credit/refund of local taxes paid Imposing the tax 
3. DPC - Deemed paid credit are Imposing the tax 
4. MC - Matching credit the specific Income Item 
5. TS - tax sparing 
6. Ex - exempted 
7. Capital letter(s) after the rate Indicate the country Imposing the tax. 
e. If no country Is Indicated It means that both countries are Imposing the tax. 
9. Dash (-) means that there Is no treaty provision for the specific Income item. 
1/ Income from operation of ships and aircraft In Infl traffic of MFN countries are 
exempted from this tax beginning on April 2,1961. 
2/ If the recipient Is an RP-flnancial institution 
3/ In Thailand the tax should not be lower than 50% of local rate 
SOURCE: Atty. V.C. Rodriguez, I.O.D.. BIR. 
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situation in the foreign exchange market or BOP, and 4) the unfavorable exchange rate policy 
that has been pursued by the government 
On the exchange rate policy, Medalla (1990) pointed out that the Philippines has been trying 
to maintain a fixed nominal exchange rate for periods of time, until it is forced to devalue. This 
has resulted in real appreciation of the peso since domestic inflation rate has been higher than the 
world inflation rate. This is shown in Table 26. The real effective exchange rate index has tended 
to decline in 1989, implying some appreciation of the domestic currency. Still, the recent huge 
de facto devaluation of the Philippine peso from P22/US$1 to P28/US$1 seems inadequate 
considering the fact that the black market rate is 8 percent above the official rate. The 
government maintains an overvalued exchange rate policy by pursuing a high interest rate policy. 
Investors that came in at an overvalued exchange rate are now encountering huge losses since 
they could remit fewer dollars than before. This is one case wherein the overvaluation of the 
domestic currency weakens the attractiveness of having a more liberal policy on profit 
remittances. On the other hand, potential investors are withholding their investment since they 
believe that the domestic currency is still overvalued. The Philippines should therefore pursue a 
more realistic exchange rate policy to encourage foreign investments. 
Still another factor discouraging foreign investment is the lack of consensus among 
government officials regarding the promotion of foreign investments. There were already several 
cases wherein foreign investments pushed by one government office were questioned by other 
government agencies, thereby forcing foreign investors to abrogate their plans to invest in the 
country. 
VII. INTER-COUNTRY FINANCIAL COOPERATION: LESSONS FROM 
THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM 
Asean countries have been exerting a lot of effort in forging financial cooperation among 
themselves. Both the private and government sectors have been involved in these cooperations . 
But where will this continuing cooperation lead? One could think of the Asean following the 
footsteps of those that have already forged some kind of formal inter-country financial 
cooperation such as the European Monetary System (EMS), which is the most advanced form of 
regional financial cooperation. It is, therefore, worthwhile to review the progress of the EMS and 
to draw some lessons from it for Asean financial cooperation. 
The EMS development can best be understood in the context of attempts by the EEC to create 
an economic and monetary union. EEC leaders approved in 1972 the Werner Report which 
envisaged the gradual attainment of monetary unification within a decade. The Report 
specifically states that: "Economic and Monetary Union means that the main economic policy 
decisions will be taken at Community level and therefore the necessary powers will be 
transferred from the national to the Community level. The adoption of a single currency could be 
the final stage of this union, ensuring the irreversibility of the process." Soon after this, several 
8. These initiatives are discussed in the next chapter. 
Table 26 
Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate Index, 1972-1988 
Year Nominal Effective Real Effective 
Exchange Rate Index Exchange Rate Index 
<*} (%) 
1972 100.00 100.00 
19.73 108.89 105.01 
1974 107.67 87.88 
1975 114.71 96.79 
1976 115.78 100.43 
1977 119.00 102.94 
1978 130.01 110.60 
1979 130.03 98.41 
1980 131.52 92.51 
1981 133.91 90.21 
1982 136.18 87.30 
1983 174.27 107.49 
1984 254.57 105.04 
1985 276.93 92.80 
1986 348.12 117.64 
1987 373.49 124.76 
1988 406.36 128.67 
1989 
Jan . 354.32 126.14 
Feb. 353.39 125.99 
*w -15-year average 
Source: Medalla (1990) 
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concrete programs were launched. These included the establishment of the "snake" arrangement 
in 1972 and the creation of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), an institutional 
machinery for short- and medium-term financial assistance. Under the "snake" arrangement, the 
EEC Central Banks agreed to set up a common margins arrangement allowing for a maximum 
spread of 2.25 percent among their currencies. The arrangement lasted for only one year, but it 
became a predecessor of the EMS. 
The oil shock in the early 1970s and the divergence in policy responses to the oil shock 
practically halted the process of monetaiy integration in EEC countries. This was revived only in 
1979 with the creation of the EMS and the European Currency Unit (ECU). The EMS has the 
following objettives: 
1. Europe should become a zone of internal and external monetary stability (involving 
both low inflation and stable exchange rate). 
2. The EMS would provide the framework for improved economic policy cooperation 
between member states, leading to more convergence in economic performance, as 
well as better growth and increased employment 
3. The EMS should help alleviate global monetary instability through common policies 
vis-a-vis third currencies and by spreading the impact of external monetary shocks 
over all participant currencies. 
The EMS has three basic elements: an exchange rate mechanism (ERM), the European 
currency system (ECU), and credit facilities. The EMS is based on a system of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates. Guitian (1988, p.8) succinctly describes it in the following: 
Within this regime, each participating currency has a central rate relative to the 
ECU. From the linkage among these central rates for the ECU, a grid of bilateral 
central rates can be derived for which margins of fluctuations of +2.25 percent (6 
percent for Italy) have been established. At these margins, participating central 
banks are obliged to intervene in unlimited amounts, in principle in ERM currencies, 
although intervention is also allowed in outside currencies (mainly US dollars). 
Studies evaluating the effectiveness of the EMS have more or less reached the conclusion that 
exchange rate variability is much lower for EMS currencies than for other major currencies and 
that the tendency toward lower variability in EMS currencies has strengthened in recent years. In 
short, EMS has improved exchange rate stability in member countries. This was not achieved at 
the price of interest rate variability. Moreover, price inflation has fallen further and converged 
more rapidly in EMS countries than in non-EMS countries in the communities. Although there is 
no explicit rule concerning inflation, there is however an unwritten rule that Germany decides its 
domestic inflation rate and all other members adopt policies to adjust gradually their own to i t In 
effect, the German inflation rate has become the target inflation rate for the system. 
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EMS owes partly its success to its flexibility. It provides a balance between rules and 
discretion by providing a framework that contributes to the process of coordination of national 
economic policies. 
Although substantial progress has already been achieved with EMS serving as the focal point 
for improved monetary coordination among member countries, much remain to be desired. 
Several EEC countries have not yet joined the exchange rate mechanism. Also, fiscal policy 
coordination still lags behind monetary coordination. 
The ECU, created in 1979 to replace the European Unit of Account (EUA), fulfills several 
functions. It serves as the numeraire for expressing central rates used in the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS, as the unit in which EMS intervention credits ark denominated, and as 
the unit in which various financial assets and obligations, both official and private, are 
denominated. Presently, the ECU's role in the operating mechanism of the EMS has been very 
limited. In particular, the build-up of intervention balances to be settled in ECUs has been very 
small. As a denominator for financial transactions, however, the ECU has gained considerable 
popularity. This was achieved through the active support of the EEC institutions and certain 
European governments in using the ECU in private markets through suasion, market operations 
in the unit, and, in some cases, through preferential treatment For instance, the EEC, the 
European Investment Bank, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic 
Energy Community, and the Council of Europe Resettlement Fund all launched bond issues in 
ECUs. 
It has been expressed that a single currency is a desirable feature of a monetary union. The 
plan is to develop the ECU into a common currency. Hence, it will be transformed from a basket 
of currencies into a genuine currency. 
Several lessons may be drawn from the EMS experience. The creation of the zone of 
increasing monetary stability like the one in EMS countries seems to be a desirable objective for 
Asean countries. It should be noted, however, that monetary stability is only an intermediate 
target while growth and investment will be the ultimate targets. A higher exchange rate stability 
in Asean countries will be favorable to Asean investors since they will face a lower level of risk 
concerning their rates of return. For a certain level of interest rates, the exchange rate stability 
will improve investment prospects and, ultimately, growth prospects. This requires a program of 
financial integration similar to the EMS. 
At least two closely linked elements are involved in any attempt at Asean financial 
integration. The first pertains to coordination of monetary policies, and the second, to the freeing 
of capital transactions among the member countries. Coordination of monetary policies, as a first 
step, involves harmonization of monetary policies. This is rather a long shot for Asean countries 
fpr sevaral resons. First, Asean countries are in varying stages of economic development, 
whereas EMS countries are more or less in the same stage of development (Table 27). Countries 
at the same level of development will likely have common aims; and commonality of aims will 
likely result in similar policy stance. This facilitates policy coordination. Second, financial 
systems in Asean countries have been restrictive in varying degrees. As Tyabji (1989, p.l) 
observes: "Arguably this has not retarded growth, since the region is one of the fastest growing in 
the world. However, within Asean, the country with the least restrictions has attained rapid 
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Table 27 
Per Capita Income, 1987 (in US$) 
Per Capita 
Country Income 
EMS: 
Belgium 11,480 
Denmark 14,930 
France 12,790 
Germany 14,400 
Ireland 6,120 
Italy 10,350 
Netherlands 11,860 
A v e r a g e 11,704 
standard deviation 2,724 
Asean: 
Malaysia 1,810 
Indonesia 450 
Philippines 590 
Thailand 850 
Singapore 7,940 
Brunei 15,390 
A v e r a g e 4,505 
standard deviation 5,518 
a/ Data cutoff date is 30 April 1989. 
Source: World Development Report, 1989. 
64 
growth on a sustained basis and achieved a much higher level of development." The first task, 
therefore, is to undo those restrictions such as entry restrictions, interest rate ceilings on loans and 
deposits, and controls on credit allocation so that the domestic financial markets of Asean 
countries can exploit their potentials. Actually, this process was started in the 1980s. Reforms in 
the banking sector particularly in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand include privatizing 
domestic banks, deregulating deposit and loan rates, liberalizing bank entry and branching, and 
improving prudential regulations. The process of deregulation is still ongoing in most Asean 
countries. It is thus worthwhile, at this early stage while reforms are still ongoing, to work 
toward harmonizing regulations and policies, such as prudential regulations and intermediation 
taxes. It is believed that there is still a chance to coordinate monetary policy in the future, once 
substantial liberalization in the domestic financial markets of Asean countries is achieved. 
Coordination of monetary policies will provide a strong signal toward integration. 
Next comes the second element: any attempt at monetary policy coordination among Asean 
countries should be accompanied by the freeing of capital transactions among the member 
countries. In EMS countries, capital account liberalization, which just started recently, came 
after trade account liberalization. In Asean countries, however, substantial trade barriers still 
exist as discussed in Chapter HI. If the EMS process were to be followed, this suggests that 
monetary policy coordination cannot be launched unless trade barriers among Asean countries 
are removed. Perhaps, this is one area where Asean countries can take a different path from that 
of EMS countries. More specifically, it is suggested that liberalization of the capital account need 
not wait for the liberalization of the trade account because the intention of monetary policy 
coordination is to reduce the variability of inflation and exchange rates to make the region 
conducive to investment. 
Establishing an Asean currency unit (ACU) could be done together with the start of monetary 
policy coordination. Clearly, the absence of the latter could undermine any efforts in promoting 
the ACU. 6 
The role of financial institutions is crucial in the move toward monetary policy coordination. 
In EMS countries, short-term financing mechanism is readily available for meeting temporary 
BOP deficits and for intervention purposes. Existing Asean finance institutions like the Asean 
Finance Corporation, and certain facilities like the Asean Swap Arrangement could be geared up 
to assume those roles in the future. 
VIII. REVIEW OF EXISTING ASEAN COOPERATION 
IN BANKING AND FINANCE 
This chapter reviews the existing Asean cooperation in the area of banking and finance. 
Perhaps, this is one area where the private sectors of Asean countries have heavily participated 
either by setting up their own institutions for regional cooperation or by advancing proposals for 
cooperative mechanisms to their respective governments. The programs/institutions being 
reviewed are the Asean Swap Arrangement, the use of Asean currencies in intra-Asean trade, the 
Asean Finance Corporation (AFC), the Asean Fund, and the Asean cooperations in insurance. 
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The Asean Swap Arrangement 
This arrangement was established by the Asean Central Banks (excluding Brunei) in August 
1977 to provide short-term swap facilities for member countries with temporary liquidity 
problems. It operates through swaps of US dollars against the currency of the borrowing Asean 
country. Each member is supposed to contribute US$40 million and may borrow up to US$80 
million. The five Asean member countries take turns in acting as managing agent The 
arrangement is supposed to last for five years. Its success prompted the Asean Central Banks to 
renew it four times. The fourth renewal was done in January 1987. 
The facility serves as a last resort financing for Asean Central Banks. None availed of it in 
the first few years and in the last few years when Asean Central Banks had easy access to other 
facilities. But in times of great need, Asean countries availed of the facility. The Philippines, for 
instance, availed of it during the height of its BOP problem. The country did not avail of it in 
recent years because other financing facilities were readily available. 
There is no doubt that the Asean Swap arrangement is the clearest manifestation of a 
successful Asean cooperation. However, it does not have any impact on intra-Asean trade and 
investment. 
Liberalization in the Use of Asean Currencies in Intra-Asean Trade* 
The idea originated from the Asean private banking sector, which proposed that Asean 
governments formally agree to permit Asean- based traders to use any Asean currency as the 
medium of exchange for intra-Asean trade. There are at least three advantages in this 
arrangement. First, it will conserve hard currencies of Asean countries and, at the same time, 
promote intra-Asean trade. Second, it will ensure the supply of critical imports that can be readily 
supplied by Asean countries. Third, it will stimulate the expansion of intra-Asean banking 
activities with increased intra-Asean trade flows. 
One disadvantage, however, is that it will subject traders to greater exchange risk if Asean 
currencies constantly and widely fluctuate in opposite directions. Of course, traders can defend 
themselves by either using the currencies as soon as possible or by effecting a forward sales' 
market for currencies to insure themselves. Nevertheless, risks and transaction costs are still 
involved in this approach. The first best solution would be to reduce exchange rate variability 
among Asean currencies. This only emphasizes the need for greater monetary policy coordination 
among Asean countries, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Liberalizing Asean currencies was not difficult to forge since two of the six Asean countries, 
Singapore and Brunei, have already liberal foreign exchange policies that allow their traders to 
use any medium of exchange acceptable to the exporter. In other Asean countries, liberalization 
in the use of Asean currencies began in 1987 in response to the proposal of the private banking 
sector. Since January 1987, Malaysia has allowed traders to use any foreign currency, except that 
9. Most of the information in this section were obtained from the files (memoranda, letters, etc.) of the Bankers Association 
of the Philippines and reports submitted to the ASEAN Committee on Banking and Finance during a meeting held in Bangkok in 
May 1990. 
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of Israel and Africa, for foreign-related trade. For payments in ringgit for exports, the ringgit 
must be from an External Account (i.e., a ringgit account of a non-resident with a financial 
institution in Malaysia). 
Indonesia also allows traders to use any medium of exchange to finance their imports and 
exports. However, Bank Indonesia accepts only US dollars for reimbursement of export 
proceeds and sells only US dollars to finance imports. 
Payments for international trade by importers and exporters of Thailand can be made in any 
foreign currency. However, the use of the baht for this purpose is allowed only through the 
"Transferable Baht Account" of non-residents in Thailand. Starting 26 July 1989, the Bank of 
Thailand has allowed commercial banks to act on behalf of the exchange control officers in 
approving the requested transfers of the baht currency into non-resident transferable account for 
payment of imported goods and trade-related expenditure. In May 1989, Thailand dismantled all 
exchange restrictions on current international transactions. 
The Philippines in September 1987 expanded the list of currencies as payments for exports to 
include all Asean currencies. The only restriction was that, in the case of the Philippine peso, 
such may be received in payment of exports only if it was used earlier as payment for imports 
from any of the Asean countries. This restriction was lifted in August 1990. Thus, the current 
regulation stipulates that - 1) the Philippine peso may be used in payment of exports or imports 
from any of the Asean countries, 2) other Asean currencies shall be accepted as payment of 
exports and imports, 3) all transactions shall be covered by bank- documented payment form, and 
4) the CB shall not be asked to intervene in the clearing of any balances resulting from the 
operation of this scheme. The Philippine CB has included all Asean cunrencies in its daily 
exchange rate quotation since 8 September 1987. 
The results of the liberalized use of Asean currencies in intra- Asean trade have been 
encouraging. All Asean countries reported an increasing trend in the use of Asean currencies, 
especially in those currencies that had not been accepted before as medium of exchange. Reports 
of individual countries showed the following: 
Brunei Darussalam 
Ninety-five percent of the accounts involving Asean trade were settled with Asean currencies. 
Available data on the value of intra-Asean currency settlements through commercial banks 
showed that Singapore dollar accounted for 82 percent. But what is notable is the increasing use 
of the Malaysian, Philippine, and Thai currencies in the settlements. 
Indonesia 
Of the total trade transactions with Asean countries, less than 20 percent were settled in 
Asean currencies. Singapore dollar was the dominant settlement currency. 
Malaysia 
Around 23 to 28 percent of its total receipts and 12 to 14 percent of its total payments were 
settled in ringgit Singapore dollar was also used widely as a settlement currency accounting for 
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5 to 7 percent of its total receipts and about 10 percent of its total payments. To a lesser extent, 
rupiah, baht, and Brunei dollar were also used for trade settlement. 
Philippines 
Available information on the value of intra-Asean currency settlements pertains to the CB's 
over-the-counter purchases of Asean currencies. Figures indicate a continuing growth in the use 
of Asean currencies. Still, Singapore dollar dominates. Noteworthy is the significant rise in the 
CB's over-the-counter purchases of Malaysian, Brunei, Thailand, and Indonesian currencies 
during the period 1986 to 1989 (Table 28). 
Thailand 
The proportion of trade settled in Asean currencies compared to the value of Thailand's trade 
with other Asean countries rose by 11.5 percent in 1989 against 10.7 percent in 1988. 
So far, available information suggest that with the liberalized use of Asean currencies, Asean 
countries were able to conserve their hard currencies in intra-Asean trade transactions. However, 
it could not be ascertained yet whether the arrangement has induced more trade among Asean 
countries. More detailed information are needed to answer this question. But the conservation of 
hard currencies that result from this arrangement is in itself already a big achievement. More 
importantly, the acceptability of Asean currencies in intra-Asean trade augurs well for the future 
creation of an Asean Currency Unit. 
Asean Finance Corporation 
The Asean Finance Corporation (AFC) is another concrete manifestation of regional 
cooperation among the private banking sector under the leadership of the Asean Banking 
Council. It was set up in 1981 with five Asean countries contributing Singapore $20 million each 
to the initial capital to finance Asean industrial cooperative projects and to provide venture 
capital to Asean entrepreneurs. Schulze (1988) made a thorough assessment of the AFC, and 
most of his conclusions still hold today. Specifically, AFC is generally liquid and undertakes 
mostly money market activities. But it is characterized by slow growth. Hence, it is not able to 
attract more equity funds. AFC cannot be faulted entirely for this since there have not been 
enough industrial cooperative projects to support Other serious weaknesses were pointed out by 
Schulze. One is the conflict of interest between shareholders and the AFC which could have 
resulted in having the latter accept highly risky but less profitable ventures while the former take 
the less risky but more profitable ones. Another weakness is that, being a private corporation, 
AFC cannot tap cheap sources of funds usually given by donor foreign governments. A proposal 
to deal with these weaknesses and to reorient AFC is put forward in the last chapter. 
Asean Fund Limited 
The Asean Fund is another project of the Asean Banking Council that was just recently 
launched. It is cashing in on the worldwide popularity of mutual funds to raise capital in more 
developed countries for investment in shares of stocks in less developed countries. The 
Philippines alone has two closed-in funds, one listed in the New York Stock Exchange and the 
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other in the London International Stock Exchange. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have 
similar closed-in funds listed abroad. 
The objectives of the Fund are to -
1. Provide a greater measure of liquidity for Asean stock markets; 
2. Foster the development of unlisted small- and medium-sized indigenous companies; 
3. Offer enhanced visibility for Asean countries; and 
4. Help promote the respective countries' fund management industries. 
To attain the second objective, the Fund will invest 20 percent of its initial proceeds in 
securities of emerging growth companies that are not listed on any securities exchange in Asean 
countries, while the 80 percent will be invested principally in securities that are listed on any 
stock exchange in the Asean countries. The Fund, therefore, provides a vehicle for investors 
seeking long-term capital appreciation through investments in securities of companies in the 
Asean countries. 
The Fund is incorporated under the laws of Singapore. It will initially issue 15 million shares 
at an offering price of Singapore $10 per share. The Fund will be listed in the Singapore Stock 
Exchange. 
It is still too early to make an assessment of the Fund since it was just launched. 
Asean cooperation in Insurance10 
Cooperation in the insurance sector among Asean countries is fairly advance. The 
government and private sectors of Asean countries have greatly contributed to the progressive 
cooperation in this sector. 
The Asean Insurance Council (AIC), composed of the insurance.commissioners of Asean 
countries, was established in 1978. Its annual meeting has continuously provided an excellent 
forum for the promotion of Asean cooperation in insurance. Several projects for cooperative 
action were put forward in past fora, and quite a number of them have already been implemented. 
One of the accomplishments of the AIC is the construction of the Unified Forms of Insurance 
Statistics. This project seeks to disseminate information on market conditions and practices 
prevailing in each member country and to promote intra-Asean trade in insurance. The different 
forms that are being used contain the following detailed information: 
Form 1: Profit and Loss Statement: Life Insurance 
Form 2: Summary of Life Insurance Policies 
Form 3: Profit and Loss Statement: Non-Life Insurance 
Form 4: Statement of Premiums and Claims: Non-Life Insurance 
10. Much of the information here are culled from the proceedings of the annual meetings of AIC, the annual reports of the 
Insurance Commission of the Philippines, and interviews with the Insurance Commissioner of the Philippines and the General 
Manager of the National Reinsurance Corporation. 
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Form 5: Balance Sheet: Life Insurance 
Form 6: Key Economic Indicators 
The first obstacle, i.e., standardizing concepts and definitions, was already resolved by the 
Council. The remaining obstacle is to come up with the report on a timely basis. To a great 
extent, this depends on the efforts exerted by the individual Asean insurance commissioners. The 
Insurance Institute for Asia and the Pacific (HAP), which is based in the Philippines, has been 
assigned to organize and analyze the insurance statistics submitted by member countries. The 
first report appeared in 1986. The latest report put out by HAP came out in October 1990 
containing the statistics for 1987 and 1988. Given the amount of data reported in the Unified 
Forms of Insurance Statistics, one can readily make a comparative analysis of the performance of 
the insurance sector of Asean countries. For instance, one might want to know the extent of 
coverage of life insurance in each Asean country as may be indicated by the ratio of the number 
of insured persons (life insurance) to the population. The ratio for 1988 was 2.25 percent for 
Indonesia, 4.82 percent for Thailand, 12.63 percent for the Philippines, 14.51 percent for 
Malaysia, and 46.23 percent for Singapore. 
Another important accomplishment of the AIC is the Comparative Study on Insurance and 
Supervision including Tax Laws on Insurance. This project hopes to keep member countries 
informed of timely developments in insurance legislations and regulations. The report contains 
comprehensive and detailed information on regulations governing the operations of insurance 
companies in the Asean countries. They include the following: 
1. Legislation governing insurance operations. 
2. Structure of national insurance markets. 
3. Granting of authorization to operate as insurer. 
4. Legal forms of concerns and control of insurance contracts and tariffs. 
5. Rules related to technical reserves. 
6. Financial guarantees other than technical reserves. 
7. Investments of insurance enterprises. 
8. Rules governing reinsurance operations. 
9. Measures related to solvency. 
10. Settlement of claims. 
11. Regulation of sales agencies and technical services. 
12. Insurance tax laws and regulations. 
The latest report came out in October 1990, a monumental accomplishment of the Council. 
The rennrt gives the similarities and differences of insurance regulations and tax laws among 
Asean countries. This is an important step toward understanding the insurance systems of 
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member countries if cooperation is at all to be promoted in this sector. It can also aid the Council 
in pinpointing areas where harmonization of regulations is needed. It is, therefore, necessary to 
constantly update the report so that changes in the insurance regulations in one country can be 
made known immediately to others. 
In the area of insurance education and training, the Council organized several training 
programs. The courses offered in these programs were meant to improve the skills and 
knowledge of the supervisory staff of the Asean Insurance Commissioners. Study tours in 
developed countries were also organized to enable Asean officials to gain insights into 
operations, supervisory systems, and marketing practices of the insurance industry of these 
countries. 
The private sector was not to be left out in Asean cooperation in the insurance sector. They 
established in 1982 the Asean Reinsurance Pool with three separate pools - treaty pool (non-
marine), an excess-of-loss pool (non-marine), and a facultative pool (non-marine). The Pool 
seeks to retain a significant proportion of reinsurance premiums that had been completely 
captured before by re-insurance companies of non-Asean countries. About one and a half years 
ago, it was decided to replace the Asean Reinsurance Pool by the Asean Reinsurance Corporation 
to give it greater flexibility. It was incorporated in Singapore with Asean insurance companies as 
stockholders. In the case of the Philippines, it was decided that the National Reinsurance 
Corporation of the Philippines be the sole stockholder in the Asean Reinsurance Corporation 
since it is owned by private insurance companies in the country1 
The Corporation is off to a modest start. Booked premiums in 1989 amounted to Singapore 
$2.5 million, for the first half of 1990, the amount reached to Singapore $2.6 million. The 
corporation incurred losses amounting to Singapore $266 thousand in 1989 and Singapore $128 
thousand during the first half of 1990. This is to be expected in its first few years of operation 
because of the need to build the corporation's reserves. 
The governments of Asean countries have been providing support to the coiporation. In the 
case of the Philippines, which has strict regulations on non-trade (invisible) payments in hard 
currencies, the Insurance Commissioner received the authority to approve remittance of 
reinsurance premiums to reinsurance companies abroad. 
While it cannot be denied that achievements in Asean cooperation in the insurance sector 
have been impressive, the process to get things done took more time than expected. This is 
because only parttime staff have been providing support to the cooperative activities. It may be 
worthwhile for the Asean commissioners to assign at least one fulltime staffmember to handle 
assignments related to Asean cooperation in the insurance sector. 
Other Initiatives 
Aside from those discussed above, other attempts at Asean cooperation were initiated by the 
private sector. Most of these were discussed by Skully (1979) and Sheng (1989). One attempt is 
11. GSIS is also a stockholder of the National Reinsurance Corporation of the Philippines. 
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the Asean bankers' acceptance (ABA). A feasibility study was conducted and the concept and 
mechanics were widely discussed through seminars and fora held in the region. However, it did 
not take off the ground for some reasons. One is that the existing facilities offered by leading 
international banks were viewed by many as more convenient and inexpensive. Another reason 
is that foreign-exchange regulations, withholding tax provisions, and foreign currency borrowing 
limits vary among Asean countries. The latter problem can be overcome through cooperation, 
but the former is a crucial problem since leading international banks, with branch networks all 
over the world offering various types of financial products, can fiercely compete with the ABA. 
Another initiative that did not take off the ground is the Asean Trading and Investment 
Corporation (ATTC). This is supposed to be patterned after the Japanese international trading 
corporations to promote intra-Asean trade and diversify Asean exports. It was not able to elicit 
enough interest by investors. The main reason is that intra-Asean trade had been minimal for the 
past years to make ATIC viable. There is no doubt, however, that ATIC will become viable once 
intra-Asean trade reaches a certain level. 
IX. SOME INITIATIVES FOR ASEAN COOPERATION 
IN BANKING AND FINANCE 
Although several cooperative programs in the area of banking and finance were already 
launched by the Asean countries with varying degrees of success, there is still room for 
cooperation that will enhance intra-Asean trade and investment In this chapter, some initiatives 
that may be considered by the Committee on Finance and Banking (COFAB) will be discussed. 
Some of these were already put forward before, but they are still cited here to emphasize their 
importance to the Asean. 
Asean Cooperation in the Insurance Sector 
As already mentioned, Asean cooperation in this area is already fairly advance. Nevertheless, 
more proposals for cooperation have been submitted to the AIC. An example is a very detailed 
proposal for the setting up of an Asean Oil and Gas Insurance Facility presented to the AIC in 
October 1990. Two other proposals to be presented here deal with increasing trade in insurance 
services in the Asean region, and encouraging Asean countries to export to non-traditional 
markets. 
Increasing trade in insurance services 
Rationale. So far, regional discussions have been focused on trade in goods. In light of the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations on trade in financial services and the increasing pressure exerted 
by developed economies on developing economies to open up their financial services sector, 
there is a need for Asean countries to increase their level of cooperation in this area in order to 
deal with these new developments and to initiate trade in financial services in the region. In the 
following discussion, trade in insurance services will be emphasized. 
The insurance sector of Asean countries has been heavily regulated and, because of this, trade 
in insurance services among them is virtually nil. Two major arguments justify heavily 
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regulating and protecting the insurance sector. One is the need to provide consumer protection. 
Consumers of insurance services may find it too costly to gather information about the financial 
health of providers of insurance services. This is true especially when it conies to insurance firms 
offering services in one country bat established in another country. The other argument is that 
the insurance sector is the major provider of long-term funds to LDCs. In the absence of a 
well-developed capital market, governments of LDCs usually limit the export of funds generated 
by the insurance sector, they also restrict the export of funds from direct purchase of insurance 
services by residents from foreign insurance providers, so that such funds could be made 
available to the domestic economy. In view of these, LDCs have made it difficult for foreign 
providers of insurance services to enter the domestic market Other restrictions include 
discriminatory tax measures and stiff licensing requirements. However, these restrictions have 
led to a limited capacity of the domestic insurance firms to provide adequate services to domestic 
residents as well as to inefficiency and lack of competitiveness of the domestic insurance sector. 
As Park (1990) pointed out, the average size of insurance companies in the Asean, in terms of 
premium is only US$8.4 million or 1/9 of the world, average. Economies of scale and scope are 
far from being achieved. Hence, liberalizing the insurance sector of Asean countries should be 
considered seriously. 
However, liberalization should be done gradually. It should proceed first with the opening of 
the insurance markets among Asean countries before opening them to other countries. Asean 
countries could use this to convince non-Asean countries that it is a part of the overall process of 
progressive liberalization of their financial sector. This would lessen the pressure exerted by 
economically developed countries on the Asean countries' insurance system to open up; it would 
also give them enough time and opportunities to gear up their insurance system to a more 
competitive environment in the future when the sector is fully liberalized. Note that trade in 
insurance services complements trade in goods which the Asean countries are trying to promote. 
Moreover, as will be pointed out later, it will enhance intra- Asean investment 
The scheme. The proposal this study recommends is that Asean countries should initiate 
trade in insurance services. This can take two forms. One is cross-border trade between providers 
and consumers of insurance services. This does not require the establishment or maintenance of 
funds in the importing country. The other is trade between domestic consumers and foreign 
business firms licensed to do business within the territory of the host country. This requires 
cross-border movements of factors of production. Foreign presence may take in the form of 
subsidiaries, branches, or joint ventures with domestic entrepreneurs. Both forms of trade in 
insurance services should be promoted in the Asean region. All these, however, require 
liberalization of certain rules and regulations covering the insurance sector. 
On cross-border trade in insurance services, there is a need to determine what product lines 
may be opened. It is our view that large industrial risks be singled out in this transaction since 
the retailing of other insurance services, such as motor vehicle insurance, can be done more 
efficiently by insurance firms established within the territory. Insurance companies in one Asean 
country could be more familiar with risks involved in an industry being established in another 
Asean country because of their experience in their own country. Hence, those industries should 
be allowed to obtain directly insurance services from those insurers. Also, joint venture firms of 
Asean entrepreneurs may be allowed to secure an insurance coverage from an insurance provider 
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licensed to operate in any of the countries where the Asean investors of such joint venture firm 
reside. In such a case, there is a need to liberalize rules covering the selling of insurance services 
by non-established insurers without a locally licensed broker. This should be complemented by a 
revision of certain legal provisions such that residents may be able to enforce in domestic courts 
insurance contracts sold by non-licensed insurers. Rules on import and export of insurance 
premium should also be relaxed. 
On establishment-related trade in insurance services, more liberalization among Asean 
countries is also needed. At present, the degree of restrictiveness on foreign equity participation 
substantially differs among Asean countries, with the Philippines being the most restrictive and 
Singapore the most liberal. Moreover, a license to operate as an insurer is difficult to secure. 
Intra-Asean investment in the insurance sector can be promoted if investment rules on this sector 
were relaxed and harmonized. The idea is to give insurance companies or entrepreneurs from an 
Asean country a wider array of investment opportunities in other Asean countries. They may 
choose, for instance, to establish a branch, a subsidiary, or have joint ventures with insurance 
companies or entrepreneurs in other Asean countries. Branches and subsidiaries of Asean 
insurance companies should be accorded competitive opportunities similar to those of domestic 
insurers. 
As already mentioned above, governments of LDCs including Asean countries have imposed 
restrictions on placements of investible funds of insurance companies abroad. Even Singapore 
does this. While the intention is to make long-term funds available to the local economy, the 
restriction actually penalizes insurance firms since they cannot maximize the return on their funds 
unless the domestic economy always offers the best investment alternatives. 
Liberalizing trade in insurance services in the Asean region should also extend to investment 
activities of insurance companies. Investible funds of an insurance company of an Asean 
member country should be invested in any financial instruments in the Asean region. This will 
hopefully increase intra-Asean investment flows. Again, this requires agreement among Asean 
countries on what investment instruments would qualify. Shares listed in stock exchanges of 
Asean countries would definitely be a prime candidate. 
Role ofAIC. Liberalizing trade in insurance services does not require the creation of a new 
and permanent institution. However, a lead institution must be singled out to take the initiative. 
The AIC is the appropriate institution to initiate the move to liberalize trade in insurance services 
in the Asean region. It already has a strong link with national insurance associations. It also has 
a number of activities that can be quickly reoriented to support the liberalization process. For 
instance, its activities related to comparative study on insurance legislation and supervision could 
be expanded to include the preparation of a draft document that would outline in detail the scope 
of the agreement to liberalize trade in insurance services and the procedures for doing it. 
Timetable. The AIC should convene a meeting in June 1991 to discuss this proposal. The 
Insurance Institute for Asia and the Pacific (HAP) may start working on the draft document in the 
following month. An expert from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) may be asked to help the IIAP in preparing the document. The complete draft will 
be presented to the AIC for consideration in December 1991. A ministerial meeting may be held 
in March 1992. After this meeting, Asean countries may be given six months to prepare 
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themselves for the program implementation. Legal issues should be ironed out during this 
period. Actual implementation may start in October 1992. 
Asean export credit facility 
Rationale. This scheme is not designed to increase intra-Asean trade, but rather to strengthen 
the competitive position of Asean countries in the international markets through cooperation. 
Export transactions are usually undertaken in credit Thus, aside from the quality and price of 
export commodities, the ability to sell on credit also determines the competitiveness of a country 
in the international markets. With other things being equal, countries that cannot offer 
competitive credit terms will always be left behind. But selling on credit involves risks, and this 
may undermine the willingness of exporters to deal on deferred payments. 
The change in the economic orientation of East European countries and the USSR, and the 
economic integration of Western Europe could translate into new economic opportunities for 
Asean countries. They could intensify their export diversification efforts by including such 
non-traditional markets. However, the lack of a facility to determine the credit worthiness of new 
buyers makes exports to non-traditional markets definitely riskier than to traditional markets. 
This then undermines the aggressiveness of Asean exporters to find new markets. 
The proposed Asean Export Credit Insurance Facility is intended to deal with these problems. 
It will encourage Asean exporters, especially those exporting non-traditional goods to non-
traditional markets, to aggressively open new business in new markets since their worries about 
being unable to collect payment for their exports are minimized. It can also strengthen their 
competitive position since the availability of an insurance facility will help them offer better 
credit terms to their buyers. Those that have problems with accessing production credit will 
benefit from the insurance facility since they can use the insurance cover as additional collateral. 
The scheme. The proposed Asean Credit Insurance Facility will insure Asean exporters 
against the possibility that their buyers abroad could not make payments on exports they made on 
credit. It shall cover both commercial and non-commercial risks for which coverage is not yet 
available. Coverage may include the following specific risks: 
1. Insolvency; 
2. Protracted default; 
3. Contract repudiation by the buyer, 
4. Exchange transfer delays; 
5. Imposition of import license ban; 
6. War, revolution, boycotts, strikes, and similar events; 
7. Expropriation, nationalization, confiscation; 
8. Natural catastrophes; 
9. Marine insurance when not otherwise insurable due to war; and 
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10. Non-acceptance of goods in violation of the contract by the buyer. 
Enterprises that are wholly owned or of which majority of the stockholders are nationals of 
Asean countries will qualify under this facility. 
The Facility shall offer general and specific insurance policies. The former requires exporters 
to insure the major portion of their business, while the latter will be issued for each separate 
export transaction that an exporter selects to cover. Both general and specific policies may be 
further classified into shipment policies, which apply to risks running from the date of actual 
shipment of exported items, and contract policies, which provide cover from the date of the 
contract. 
Organizational set-up. The Facility should be financed and managed by the private sector. 
The formula for determining the contribution of each Asean countryshall be patterned after that 
of the Asean Reinsurance Corporation. 
The Asean Reinsurance Corporation would be an ideal manager of the Facility. However, the 
preparatory work including the detailed feasibility study should be done by the AIC. 
Timetable. The AIC, representatives of the national associations of insurance companies of 
Asean countries, and the president of the Asean Reinsurance Corporation should organize a 
meeting in June 1991 to discuss this proposal. If approved, the AIC should immediately form a 
technical committee to prepare a detailed feasibility study which will be submitted in December 
1991. Representatives of the national associations of insurance companies of Asean countries and 
the Asean should meet in December 1991 to review and approve the feasibility study. The 
Facility may be opened in April 1992. 
Asean Development Bank 
Rationale. The establishment of an Asean Development Bank was earlier proposed by the 
United Nations team that conducted a study on economic cooperation for the Asean12. The 
proposal was recently echoed by Naya (1987) and Schulze (1988). A development bank that 
provides financial and technical support to regional projects facilitates regional economic 
cooperation and integration. Regional groupings have their own development bank. Examples 
are the European Investment Bank for the EEC and the Caribbean Development Bank for the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association. 
Several arguments do not favor the establishment of an Asean development bank. One 
argument is that its role and functions in the region have already been pre-empted by the 
privately initiated AFC. Yet, this is not so. AFC follows a "demand- following approach" in 
banking^whereas the proposed Bank is expected to apply mainly a "supply-leading approach" to 
banking . In other words, the proposed Bank will mainly concentrate on development banking, 
although it carries a commercial banking function to a lesser extent. It will try to secure cheap 
funds from donor agencies and serve as a conduit of financial assistance from donor countries to 
12. This is discussed in Skully (1979). 
13. These concepts were originated by Patrick (1966). 
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the Asean region. For instance, the US$2 billion Asean-Japan Development Fund could have 
been coursed through the proposed Bank. This is to the advantage of donor countries since they 
only have to deal with one institution for their assistance to the entire region. 
Another argument against the proposed Bank, which some Philippine bankers believe, is that 
it will duplicate the effort or will compete with the Asian Development Bank. Naya's 
counterargument is that the ADB is not generally equipped to handle regional projects because it 
primarily concerns itself with national projects. In the most recent past, ADB, following the 
footsteps of the World Bank, shifted its emphasis from project lending to sectoral and program 
lending. The proposed Bank is envisioned to stick to project lending. It will specialize in 
assisting the Asean region in identifying, promoting, and financing viable regional projects. 
Additionally, the proposed Bank may provide intra-Asean trade financing facilities which no 
institution in the region is doing at present. This implies that the Bank will also have a 
commercial banking function. But this latter function is prompted by the need to assist the region 
in developing trade among themselves. It should also be pointed out that the membership of 
ADB has been expanding, which could result in giving less attention to the needs of the Asean 
countries. 
It should be recalled that in the EMS countries, the European Investment Bank played a 
significant role in stimulating the use of the ECU as a denominator in financial transactions. The 
proposed Bank could play this role in the future as regards the Asean Currency Unit. 
Objectives and functions. The objective of the proposed Bank is primarily to assist the 
Asean region in identifying, promoting, and financing viable regional projects; and secondarily to 
provide intra-Asean trade financing facilities. The specific functions of the Bank are -
1. To identify regional projects and conduct feasibility studies; 
2. To provide management consultancy to regional projects; 
3. To provide financial support to regional projects in the form of long-term credit; 
4. To raise cheap funds from donor agencies to finance regional projects; 
5. To promote trade in the region by providing intra-Asean trade financing facility; and 
6. To assist the region in promoting the use of an Asean currency unit through various 
means, such as issuing bonds denominated in Asean currency unit. 
Credit facilities. The proposed Bank shall have two main credit facilities: the development 
credit facility and the trade financing facility. However, it shall allocate at least 75 percent of its 
loan portfolio to the development loan window. This is to emphasize the development function 
of the Bank. 
Organizational structure. The proposed Bank should have participation from the private 
sector and governments of Asean countries. Two alternative approaches may be taken. One is to 
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create an entirely new institution; the other is to convert AFC into the Asean Development Bank. 
Our preference is for the latter since AFC has already the necessary infrastructure to operate as a 
bank. In addition, the private sector will be immediately represented, and they do not have to 
raise so much additional capital. The charter of AFC will have to be revised to reflect the 
objectives and functions of the Bank; its capitalization should also be increased. The equity 
contribution of the private sector shall be matched by the equity contribution of the .governments 
of the Asean countries, preferably, through their national development banks. Asean countries 
may have an equal contribution to the Bank's capital, and therefore they have an equal number of 
representatives in the Board. The only requirement is that each Asean country will have at least 
two representatives in the Board: one representing the government, and the other the private 
sector. 
The Asean Development Bank should be run like a private enterprise. Thus, its president and 
management staff should be truly professional and well-versed in development banking. 
Nevertheless, it should draw on the expertise of the staff of national development banks of the 
Asean countries for project appraisal from time to time so that it can keep its permanent staff 
lean. 
Relationship with national development banks. It should be noted that Asean countries have 
their own national development banks . The proposed Asean Development Bank may establish 
formal and informal links with these banks. For instance, the Bank may hire or work jointly with 
these banks in the conduct of feasibility studies. This is important especially if the project is 
located in a particular country, in which case the national development bank has ready 
information and expertise to be shared with the Bank. 
The Bank and the national banks of the respective Asean countries should have no conflict of 
interest. The former will focus on regional projects, while the latter on national projects. 
Relationship with the ADB. ADB may cofinance regional projects being supported by the 
Asean Development Bank. The latter, however, should take the lead role in financing projects 
that it supports. 
Location. The proposed Bank should be located in Singapore and incorporated under the 
Singaporean law. 
Action plan. Since the establishment of the Asean Development Bank will doubtlessly shape 
the course of development of the region in the near future, a ministerial meeting should be held to 
discuss this proposal. The next step would be to discuss with AFC the proposal to convert it into 
a development bank for the region with government and private sector representation. The 
reorganization of AFC and infusion of additional capital should follow. 
Timetable. It is proposed that the ministerial meeting be held in June 1991 to discuss this 
proposal. A discussion with AFC should be conducted the following month. The implementation 
plan and the agreement between Asean governments and AFC should be ready by December 
1991. Actual implementation should commence by January 1992. 
14. These are BAPINDO for Indonesia. Bank Pembangunan Malaysia for Malaysia, DBP for the Philippines, and IFCT, a 
semi-government owned corporation for Thailand. 
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Export Guarantee Scheme 
Rationale. Small and medium export-oriented enterprises in Asean countries generally have 
very little access to bank credit. The main reason is that banks put more emphasis on collateral, 
and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) usually do not have adequate or acceptable collateral 
to offer. A collateral substitute is, therefore, necessary. A preshipment export finance guarantee 
scheme could do the job. Several countries, e.g., Korea and Japan, have been successful with 
their export finance guarantee programs. It might be worthwhile for Asean countries to set up a 
common preshipment export finance guarantee scheme that will provide guarantee cover to banks 
granting loans to both small and medium direct and indirect exporters who are exporting to 
other Asean countries. This should complement the trade financing facility offered by the Asean 
Development Bank. 
The scheme. To make the guarantee scheme useful, commercial banks' access to the scheme 
should be automatic. The transaction process under this export credit guarantee scheme may be 
described as follows (Figure 7): 
Step 1. Exporter receives in one's favor an immediate LC at sight in dollars under 
predetermined terms to include expiry date sufficient to provide an adequate 
period for preparation and shipment 
Step 2. Exporter assigns LC to local bank I as support for one's request to establish a 
back-to-back inland LC (BB LC) in favor of the manufacturer, or indirect exporter 
(IE). 
Step 3. Bank I obtains a preshipment guarantee from the Asean Export Credit Guarantee 
Corporation (AECGC). 
Step 4. Against the assigned export LC, exporter opens through bank II a BB LC in favor 
of the IE in local currency up to a certain percentage of the value of the underlying 
export LC and made available for a shorter period than the export LC to allow 
receipt of product, packing, and shipment by exporter. 
Step 5. IE assigns the BB LC to bank II and requests a local currency loan equal to a certain 
percent of BB LC to be used for purchase of raw material and working capital. 
Step 6. Bank II obtains preshipment guarantee from AECGC; 
Step 7. Grants loan to IE. 
Step 8. Refinances loan with the CB. 
Step 9. IE uses cash to purchase raw material from local suppliers and begins the 
manufacturing process. 
80 
Figure 7 
ASEAN Export Credit Guarantee Scheme 
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Organization. A corporation to be named Asean Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 
(AECGC) should be created. It will be owned wholly by the governments of Asean countries, 
which will give equal contribution to the required capital. The ADB may be invited as a minority 
stockholder. 
Each Asean country will have one representative in the board, preferably the Minister of 
Finance. However, the corporation should be run like a private enterprise. 
Location. The head office of the corporation may be located in any of the Asean countries, 
except Singapore since it will house the proposed Asean Development Bank. Since access of 
commercial banks to the guarantee scheme is automatic, there is no need to have a branch office 
in each member country. 
A key step. To provide bcth direct and indirect exporters equal access to AECGC financing, 
Asean countries should modernize their export financing system. One of the key elements to 
modernizing preshipment export financing is disaggregating export loans into those that 1) 
generate value added (VAL), 2) purchase domestically produced intermediate inputs (DIL), 3) 
purchase imported intermediate inputs (FIL), and 4) purchase domestically produced finished 
goods (DOL). Separating DIL from FIL, and DOL from production financing makes it possible 
to implement a domestic LC system for domestic purchase and an import LC system for imported 
inputs. Asean countries virtually do not have a domestic LC system. The development of the 
domestic LC system assures automatic availability of short-term export loans and free trade status 
to all indirect exporters. Moreover, the separation of FIL, DIL, and DOL from VAL makes it 
possible to make a quasi-physical collateral, with inputs or outputs financed by export loans 
through the automatic loan disbursement mechanism. With the creation of a quasi-physical 
collateral, it is hoped that commercial banks in Asean countries respond to the credit needs of all 
qualified exporters, whether they are direct or indirect exporters. 
Action plan. Asean governments should discuss this proposal. Once an agreement to go 
ahead with the project is reached, a thorough feasibility study should be conducted immediately. 
Timetable. A ministerial meeting should be held in June 1991 to discuss this proposal. The 
detailed feasibility study should begin in July 1991 and the results presented to a ministerial 
meeting in December 1991. Actual implementation may start during the first quarter of 1991. 
Multicountry Listing of Stocks. 
Recently, the stock markets in Asean countries expanded rapidly15. This is most noticeable 
in Thailand and Indonesia. Nevertheless, the stock markets of Asean countries are still 
considered underdeveloped, except those of Singapore and Malaysia. The number of listed firms 
is still few. A great majority of potential investors still do not have access to the stock markets 
mainly due to lack of information, high transaction costs, and inadequate supply of securities 
traded in the stock markets. 
IS. Brunei does not yet have a stock market 
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There are mechanisms to raise funds for the capital markets of individual Asean countries. 
The country funds discussed in the preceding section serve as an example. However, these are 
facilities for non-Asean investors to invest in securities of Asean firms. While the scheme 
increases the supply of funds available to Asean firms, it does not provide Asean investors 
opportunities. 
Asean investors should also be given some mechanisms for investing their funds in securities 
of other Asean countries so that more intra-Asean investment could take place. Existing policies 
on investing in the stock markets of Asean countries seem sufficient at first glance. (Table 29). 
However, access to Asean investment opportunities through this facility is limited only to a few 
large investors, not to mention the varying restrictions on capital outflows in Asean countries. 
Perhaps, a better way of broadening Asean investors' access to Asean securities markets is to 
encourage multicountry listing of securities. This will partially solve the problem of a very 
limited number of firms being listed in the stock markets of Asean countries. For instance, a 
Filipino firm, like San Miguel Corporation which is listed in the stock exchanges in the 
Philippines, could also be listed in the stock exchanges of other Asean countries. Similarly, firms 
listed in the stock exchanges of other Asean countries could be listed in the stock exchanges in 
the Philippines. Initially, each country may accept two firms from each Asean country to be 
listed in its stock exchange; these can later increase to several firms. 
One of the preconditions for implementing this program is the standardization of policies and 
regulations covering the stock markets in Asean countries. In the first place, governments in 
Asean countries have to agree on liberalizing their stock markets to encourage multicountry 
listing of Asean private securities. Secondly, criteria and procedures (e.g., disclosure 
requirements) for listing in the stock markets of Asean countries need to be standardized. 
Thirdly, tax on income from listed securities have to be harmonized (in addition to the existing 
bilateral treaties on double taxation between Asean countries). As shown in Table 30, there is a 
considerable difference in tax measures on capital gains and dividends among Asean countries. 
And lastly, regulations of capital flows should be relaxed for this specific program to allow listed 
firms to transfer funds from host countries to its mother country. This applies to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand where foreign exchange regulations are still restrictive. 
In the case of the Philippines, two more tasks have to be done. One is to unify its two stock 
exchanges so that foreign companies to be listed in the Philippine stock market will have to deal 
with only one institution. The other is that it should do away with its two classes of shares and 
use instead one class of shares for all investors. 
It might be worthwhile to apply here the principle covering the use of Asean currencies in 
intra-Asean trade which was discussed in the preceding chapter. This will circumvent the 
problem of converting one Asean currency to a hard currency, and then to another Asean 
currency; at the same time, this will enable Asean countries to conserve hard currencies. 
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Table 29 
POLICIES OF ASEAN COUNTRIES ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 
STOCK MARKETS 
Indonesia 
The December 1987 package of deregulation introduced for 
the first time to foreigners the opportunity to purchase 
shares listed on the Jakarta stock exchange. A foreign 
investor may now buy shares in a company listed on the stock 
exchange (or over-the-counter market when that has been 
established), provided that the aggregate shareholding of 
foreign investors in the company does not exceed the 
permissible level of foreign capital participation (presently 
49 percent). Moreover, a foreign investor may be restricted 
by a maximum percentage of foreign equity ownership contained 
in the constitution of any company. 
Malaysia 
There are no restrictions on non-residents investing in 
stocks, shares, and bonds listed and quoted on the local stock 
exchange except in shares of banks or bank owning companies 
where no person is permitted to own more than 20 percent of 
the equity. There may also be restrictions in the 
constitutions of some companies on the amount of foreign 
equity ownership. 
Philippines 
Non-residents who wish to invest in the local stock and 
bond markets have the option of financing their transactions 
either through an inward foreign exchange remittance or from 
a withdrawal against their foreign currency accounts in the 
Philippines and only with respect to securities registered 
with the CB. All transactions must be effected through an 
authorized security dealer or broker who registers the same 
with the CB. For sale of securities, the authorized dealer or 
broker ensures that the proceeds are immediately reinvested or 
remitted in accordance with the instructions of the investor. 
Immediate remittance of the proceeds abroad is allowed upon 
approval by the CB. 
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Singapore 
There are no restrictions on non-residents' sale or 
purchase of stocks, shares, bonds, or other marketable 
securities listed and quoted on the Singapore Stock Exchange, 
except that foreign ownership is restricted by law in the case 
of specific types of companies such as financial institutions. 
There may also be restrictions in foreign equity ownership 
contained in the constitutions of certain companies. 
Thailand 
Foreigners can invest through the Securities Exchange of 
Thailand subject to the following restrictions on foreign 
shareholding and minimal requirements on exchange control: 
1. Generally, foreign shareholding is limited to 49 
percent under the Alien Business Act, and further 
limited by other specific legislation, as for 
example, 25 percent for banking and finance 
companies. 
2. At the time of importation of foreign currency, a 
foreign investor should register the exchange 
control documents- with the Bank of Thailand so that 
request for repatriation of capital, yields and 
dividends can be automatically approved. 
Source: Asean Fund Limited Prospectus. 
Table 30 
TAX MEASURES OF ASEAN COUNTRIES 
ON CAPITAL GAINS AND DIVIDENDS 
Brunei 
There is no individual income tax in Brunei.^ However, 
all companies, whether incorporated locally or (as in the case 
of the Fund) overseas, are liable to tax at the rate of 30 
percent on any income accruing in, derived from, or received 
in Brunei. While there is no capital gains tax, there is a 
possibility that any profits made by the Fund from the resale 
of shares in Brunei companies may be treated as income and 
taxed as such at a flat rate of 30 percent. 
Under the Stamp Act, ad valorem stamp duty is payable in 
Brunei for transfers of shares in Brunei companies whether on 
sale or otherwise, computed on the price or value thereof on 
the date of the transfer of such shares. For every B$1,000 or 
a fraction thereof B$100 is charged; the stamp duty payable is 
B$0.10 when the transferee's name appears on the transfer and 
B$o.30 when the transferee's name does not appear on the 
transfer. 
Indonesia 
Non-resident taxpayers are subject to withholding tax on 
dividends received from resident Indonesian companies. The 
withholding tax rate for non-residents is 20 percent. 
The tax withheld on dividends is treated as a final tax. 
There is no provision for a refund or reclaim by the non-
resident of the tax withheld, nor is there any requirement to 
submit tax returns by the non-resident shareholder. 
A non-resident shareholder of an Indonesian company is 
not normally assessable for Indonesian tax on gains made on 
the sale of shares held by the resident in the Indonesian 
company. An exception holds if the non-resident shareholder 
creates a permanent establishment for tax purposes in 
Indonesia and the gain is made in connection with the conduct 
of business by the permanent establishment. 
Prior to 1 January 1984, the Indonesian government 
offered various tax incentives such as company tax and 
dividend tax relief for a new foreign investment. However, 
such incentives have since been withdrawn. Incentives in the 
form of exemption from or reduction of import duties and 
deferral of value added tax on the importation of certain 
equipment prices remain for approved foreign investors. 
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Malaysia 
If all transactions executed by the Fund are done through 
authorized brokers and banks, and instructions for these 
transactions are given from outside Malaysia, the Fund will 
not be deemed to be carrying on business in Malaysia and will 
be considered a non-resident foreign corporation. However, 
such brokers or banks must not have any independent authority 
to enter into contracts, except on the prior instructions of 
their clients. 
There is no capital gains tax on gains derived from the 
sale of securities of companies that are listed and quoted on 
The Kuala Lumpur stock Exchange. 
The Share (Land Based Company) Transfer Tax Act, 1984 was 
repealed effective 21 October 1988. Effective on same date, 
pursuant to the Real Property Gains Tax Act, 1976, gains 
arising from the disposal of shares in real property companies 
as defined in the Act are taxed ranging from a maximum of 20 
percent for disposal within two years to a minimum of five 
percent for disposal in the fifth and subsequent years for 
companies. There is no real property gains tax liability on 
disposal by individuals and other persons in the sixth and 
subsequent years. 
Under current Malaysian law, companies pay tax on their 
profits at the rate of 3 5 percent (from 1 January 1989) for 
income tax and five percent for development tax. The net 
after-tax dividends are not exigible to further tax. The 
Malaysian government also confirmed that development tax is to 
be abolished gradually starting with a reduction of one 
percent starting from the 1990 year of assessment. 
Interest derived from bank deposits placed by non-
residents is exempt from income tax, unless such interest is 
paid on funds required for the purpose of maintaining net 
working funds as prescribed in Section 14 of the Banking Act. 
Furthermore, no tax is exigible on interest paid to an 
individual for government bonds or securities. 
Any other interest derived from Malaysia is subject to 
income tax at 20 percent. Such tax will be withheld at source 
and paid directly to the Inland Revenue by the payer. 
Stamp duty is payable on the transfer of shares at the 
rate of M$0.03 for every Malaysian dollar of the price paid in 
purchasing the securities. 
The word "non-resident" is used above to describe a 
person who is neither resident nor maintains a permanent place 
of business in Malaysia. 
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Philippines 
Under current Philippine law, the Fund will be regarded 
as a non-resident foreign corporation if its activities are 
limited to investment in securities issued by Philippine 
corporations. 
Accordingly, the Fund will be subject to the following 
taxes: 
1. 35 percent on gross income from sources within 
Philippines, including dividend income from 
Philippine corporations (reduced to 15 percent 
under certain conditions of reciprocity). 
2. A capital gains (final) tax of 0.25 percent on the 
gross selling price for shares listed on the stock 
exchange and 20 percent on capital gains (10 
percent for the first P10Q,000) for shares that are 
not listed; and 
3. Documentary stamp taxes of PI.70 for each P200 par 
value for original issuances and P0.50 on each 
P200 for subsequent sales. 
Singapore 
Section 13C of the Income Tax Act exempts from tax the 
income of a non-resident person arising from funds managed by 
a fund manager approved by the Minister for Finance. 
The Fund although incorporated in Singapore would 
function as and be a non-resident of Singapore for tax 
purposes as its Board of Directors will meet outside 
Singapore. On that basis, the control and management of its 
business (other than that conducted through the approved fund 
managers) would be outside Singapore. 
Wardley, H&Q Asia Pacific, and SEAVI have each been 
approved by the Minister for the purposes of Section 13C. 
Regulations under Section 13C that detail the exemption 
and the terms of such relief provide that the "specified 
income" derived by a "foreign investor" shall be exempt from 
tax. The fund would come within the definition of a "foreign 
investor" as the Articles of Association restrict ownership in 
the issued capital of the fund which may be owned by Singapore 
residents or citizens to five percent or less of the total 
issued capital. Only those who are non-residents of Singapore 
and who are not citizens of Singapore may own the balance 95 
percent of the total issued capital. 
88 
A person will be treated as resident of Singapore for tax 
purposes if he or she is "resident in Singapore" as defined in 
the Income Tax Act. In this statutory definition, a person is 
resident of Singapore if — 
1. Being an individual, if in the year preceding the 
year of assessment (the basis period) he or she was 
resident of Singapore in a qualitative sense. It 
also includes a person who was physically present 
in Singapore for 183 days or more during the basis 
period. 
2. He or she does not have a permanent establishment 
in Singapore. 
3. He or she does not hold more than 20 percent of the 
issued capital of a company incorporated in 
Singapore. 
4. He or she carry on a business in Singapore either 
solely or in association with others. 
Thailand 
If all transactions executed by the Fund are done through 
a licensed securities broker, and the Fund does not maintain 
a representative in Thailand, for tax purposes it will be 
treated as not doing business in Thailand. Under current law, 
the Fund would be subject to withholding tax on dividends at 
the rate of 20 percent at the rate of 25 percent on interest 
received, and at the rate of 25 percent on capital gains. If 
shares in approved mutual funds are purchased by tfie Fund with 
foreign currency remitted into Thailand, income and benefits 
from mutual funds will be taxed at the rate of 10 percent and 
capital gains on the sale of mutual fund shares will be taxed 
at 12.5 percent. Each transaction is taxed separately so that 
transactions may not be aggregated to reduce profits to the 
extent of losses. 
In addition, stamp duty at the rate of B1.00 per B1,000 
of realized value is applicable on all transfers of shares not 
listed on the Securities Exchange of Thailand (SET) while 
transfers of shares of companies listed on the SET are 
exempted from stamp duty if the SET acts as the share 
registrar. 
Source: Asean Fund Limited Prospectus. 
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Appendix 2 
SALE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIRING PRIOR CB APPROVAL 
SEC. 54. Profits, dividends and interests of non-residents. Remittances abroad of profits, 
dividends and interests by non- residents shall be governed by the following regulations: 
a. For resident companies that are owned or controlled by non- residents engaged in 
BOI-approved projects, in export-oriented industries and non-export-oriented industries that have 
not availed of domestic credit resources, the transfer of profits and dividends abroad 
corresponding to the net profits realized, after taxes, during the year, may be allowed in full at the 
exchange rate prevailing on date of remittance. 
As used herein, the term "domestic credit resources" of resident companies owned or 
controlled by non-residents engaged in non- export-oriented industries, refers to all credit 
availments whether in cash or in kind, from any government or private banking financial 
institutions or other private sources in the Philippines. 
b. Other resident companies that are owned or controlled by non- residents may be allowed 
to transfer profits and dividends abroad in an amount equivalent to twenty-five (25%) percent of 
the non- residents' equity participation in the net profits after taxes, during the year for which the 
remittance of the earnings is being made. 
c. Filipino-controlled firms may be allowed to remit in full the shares of dividends and profits 
corresponding to the net profits realized, after taxes, during the year, due to their non-resident 
stockholders or non-resident partners abroad. The amounts of dividends and profits which may 
be remitted in accordance with the foregoing shall be net of withholding taxes. 
d. Applications for remittance of profits and dividends to non- residents shall be accompanied 
by the following: 
1. Proof of registration with the Central Bank of foreign investments upon which the 
profits/ dividends sought to be remitted have accrued; 
2. Certified copy of the Board Resolution declaring the dividends, accompanied by a 
computation indicating separately the amount of dividends/ profits due to resident 
and non-resident stockholders. 
3. Evidences of payments of withholding tax and other applicable taxes corresponding 
to the amount; 
4. Sworn statement of the remitting company's officer that the remittance will not be 
financed by domestic borrowings; and 
5. Audited financial statement as of the end of the year during which the 
dividends/profits sought to be remitted were earned. 
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e. Remittance of interest payments abroad by resident companies which have existing foreign 
obligations registered with the Central Bank prior to November 26,1969 may be allowed in full. 
For existing but not registered foreign obligations as of November 26, 1969, remittance of 
interest abroad may also be allowed in full, only upon subsequent registration with and approval 
by the Central Bank. 
f. Interest earned by non-residents from government securities (except treasury bills) may also 
be remitted in full; Provided, That the government securities were acquired by the non-resident 
before December 26, 1969, or, if acquired subsequent to said date, such acquisition has Central 
Bank approval. 
g. Applications for remittance of interest shall be substantiated by supporting documents, 
such as financial statements, income tax returns, loan contracts, an auditor's certificate that the 
amounts being remitted are correct and proof of payment of withholding tax. 
h. New applications of oil companies operating in the Philippines to purchase foreign 
exchange to cover remittance of profits, dividends, payment of royalties and other fees shall have 
the prior clearance of the Bureau of Energy Utilization. 
i. Where the remittance is applied for by multinational firms, prior clearance from the Central 
Bank Inter-Agency Committee on domestic borrowings of foreign firms, is required before any 
remittance of profits and dividends may be allowed. 
SEC. 55. Royalties^ films, rentals and others. Remittances shall be governed by the 
following rules: 
a. Remittances of royalties or rentals on patents, trademarks, copyrights and franchises may 
be allowed up to fifty percent (50%) of the royalties or rentals incurred during the year for which 
the remittance is being made; Provided, That no royalties shall exceed five percent (5%) of the 
wholesale price of the commodity which is manufactured locally under a royalty contract 
Remittance covering service, license or rental fee shall be based on agreements previously 
approved by the Central Bank. 
b. Royalties on retail sales in 1970, and the unremitted royalties for 1969 and prior years, 
shall be allowed full remittance at the royalty rates indicated in reprinting contracts entered into 
earlier, and subsisting as of February 21,1970. 
c. Royalties incurred after 1970 on reprinting contracts existing as of February 21, 1970 and 
on those concluded thereafter shall be allowed full remittance only in cases where the reprinting 
contracts confer upon the local reprinters concerned the right to market reprinted books in foreign 
countries, substantiated by documents of export shipments made; Provided, however, That the 
remittances shall not exceed the net export proceeds of the reprinter concerned arising from the 
sale abroad of the reprinted books. 
d. Royalties incurred after 1970 on reprinting contracts existing as of February 21, 1970 and 
on those concluded thereafter, where such contracts restrict the marketing rights of the local 
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reprinters concerned to the domestic market, shall be subject to the quantitative limitations 
prescribed in Items a to c above. 
e. Remittance of the producer's share of earnings made on movie films imported without 
exchange payments may be allowed up to fifty percent (50%) of the producer's share of earnings 
during the year for which the remittance is being made. Remittances for TV film rentals shall be 
governed by the individual contracts or agreements. The remitter or applicant shall substantiate 
the correctness of the amounts being transferred by the following: 
1. Copy of the Central Bank approval/registration of the distributorship agreement, 
which may be submitted only once with the application for the initial remittance of 
film rentals/producer's shares; 
2. Computation on how the producer's shares were arrived at; 
3. Copy of official receipts evidencing payment of the withholding tax corresponding 
to the amount sought to be remitted accompanied with a copy of the appropriate 
return filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and 
4. Copy of the audited Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Statement corresponding to 
the year during which the producer's shares accrued. 
f. Royalty/rental contracts involving "manufacturing royalty", e.g. actual transfer of 
technological services, such as secret formula/processes, technical know-how and the like, shall 
not exceed five percent (5%) of the wholesale price of the commodity manufactured under the 
royalty agreement For contracts involving marketing services such as the use of foreign brands 
or transactions or trademarks, the royalty rental rates shall not exceed two percent (2%) of the 
wholesale price of the commodity manufactured under the royalty agreement. The producer or 
foreign licensor's share in the proceeds from the distribution/ exhibition of the films shall not 
exceed sixty per cent (60%) of the net proceeds (gross proceeds less local expenses) from the 
exhibition/distribution of the films. 
The Monetary Board, in consultation with the Board of Investments, may authorize 
remittance of royalties on contracts providing for higher royalty/rental rates, or for terms longer 
than five (5) years; or on contracts containing restrictive provisions prohibiting the local licensees 
to export the products manufactured under the royalty/rental agreements or limiting their 
exportation abroad only through the foreign licensors as exclusive distributors. 
Remittance of royalty/rental arising from contracts involving "manufacturing or marketing 
services" shall be allowed in full, net of taxes, at the prevailing exchange rate at the time of 
remittance. 
g. Companies seeking Central Bank authority to remit royalties, fees or other forms of 
payments made to a foreign company or a foreign-owned company under the technology transfer 
arrangements covered by the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the Ministry of 
Industry, Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Board of Investments, shall submit, in addition 
to Central Bank requirements, proof of registration thereof with the Technology Transfer Board 
before any authority to remit foreign exchange will be granted. Without prejudice to its power to 
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implement monetary and fiscal policies, including remittances of foreign exchange the Central 
Bank shall take into account the royalty rates prescribed by the Technology Transfer Board. 
Technology transfer arrangements covering management and technical consultancy services 
relating to the operation of industrial enteiprises on a continuing basis, involving an aggregate 
amount of not more than US$20,000 per agreement shall be referred to the Technology Transfer 
Board for notification and approval. 
h. Withholding tax must be deducted from the amount of the allowable remittances of 
royalties or rentals on patents, trademarks, copyrights and franchises as well as from the amount 
equivalent to the producer's share of earnings made on movie films or of TV film rentals. 
i. Applications for remittance of royalty/technical service/licenseAental fees shall be 
accompanied by the following documents: 
1. Copy of Central Bank approval of the pertinent agreement, which may be submitted 
only once with the application for the initial remittance of royalty/technical 
service/licenses/rental fees. In case where the remittance represents blocked 
royalties (royalties/rentals heretofore unremitted on account of the quantitative 
restrictions provided in earlier regulations), the same shall be referred to the Central 
Bank for prior approval and shall be accompanied by proof that the remittance shall 
not be financed by domestic borrowings; 
2. Copy of official receipt evidencing payment of the withholding tax corresponding to 
the amount sought to be remitted accompanied by a copy of the appropriate return 
filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue; 
3. Statement/computation of royalty/technical service/license fees due, duly certified 
by an independent Certified Public Accountant; and 
4. Audited financial statements as of the end of the year during which the 
royalty/license fees sought to be remitted were earned. 
SEC. 56. Foreign investments. Foreign exchange remittances involving foreign investment 
in CB-approved Philippine securities shall be governed by the following rules: 
a. Central Bank approval of the entry of foreign investments is required as a pre-condition for 
repatriation of investments and earnings. Application for approval of incoming foreign 
investments shall be coursed through agent banks. 
b. Repatriation of the foreign cash investments, net of losses, may be made at any time by the 
foreign investors, subject to the terms and conditions of the swap arrangement between the 
handling bank and the Central Bank. 
c. Repatriation of foreign investments should be accompanied with proof of inward 
remittance of foreign exchange utilized for the purpose. 
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d. For repatriation of foreign investments in CB-approved Philippine securities, die following 
shall be required: 
1. Investments in CB-approved Philippine securities: 
a) Daily Report of Purchase and Sales of Philippine Securities (CBP-6.22.30); 
b) Pertinent Sales Confirmation slips; 
c) Daily Report of Repatriation of Proceeds of Sales (CBP- 6.22.32); 
d) Summary list of registered investments being liquidated; 
e) Application to Transfer Securities for Account of Non-Resident 
(CBP-FED-ASD 3); 
f) Application for Authority to Sell Securities in the Philippines for Account of 
Non-Residents (CBP-FED-ASD 5); 
g) Proof of payment of applicable taxes; and 
h) Statement of Remittance. 
2. Other investments: 
a) Evidence of registration with and approval by the Central Bank of the foreign 
investments sought to be repatriated; 
b) Copy of the Contract of Sale covering the investments sold, duly certified by 
the Secretary of the firm/company where the divestments were made; 
c) Computation showing how the amount sought to be remitted was arrived at, 
indicating the taxes due the Philippine Government and other related 
expenses; and 
d) Evidence of payment of the capital gains tax (copy of official receipt) and/or 
other taxes due the Philippine Government. 
SEC. 57. Emigrant's assets. The following rules shall govern capital transfers of Filipino 
emigrants' assets: 
a. Emigrants may remit up to a maximum of US$5,000 of their capital assets to their new 
country of domicile, subject to prior approval by the Central Bank. 
The remaining liquid capital assets may be withdrawn starting one (1) year after emigration 
on a staggered basis no exceeding five (5) years. 
b. Remittances of emigrants' assets shall be supported by proof of: 
1. permanent residence of emigrant/beneficiary abroad; 
2. ownership of the asset/s by the emigrant/ beneficiary abroad; 
3. payment of applicable taxes; 
4. applicant's authority to remit. 
Additional proofs shall be required in the following cases: 
1) Remittance of income from real properties - Statement of rentals/income 
earned certified by an independent CPA. 
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2) Remittance of proceeds of sale of capital assets -
a) Copy of deed of sale. 
b) If the subject of the sale is real estate, proof that the transaction was 
registered with the Register of Deeds. 
3) Remittance of proceeds of retirement benefits 
a) Evidence of payment of retirement benefits. 
b) If the filing for remittance is five (5) years or over after receipt of the 
retirement pay, evidence regarding custody of the funds. 
4) Capital transfer of testate and intestate inheritance and legacies -
a) Copy of Court Order approving the partition and distribution of estate. 
b) Copy of the extra-judicial settlement and partition duly registered with the 
Registered of Deeds. 
5) Remittances of proceeds of life insurance benefits - Proof of payment of the 
proceeds of the policy. 
6) Remittances of proceeds of sales of personal property - Copy of the deed of 
sale. 
7) Remittances of proceeds of sale of shares of stock -
a) Copy of the confirmation of sale of authorized securities dealer or broker 
or the issuing corporation. 
b) Certification of stock transfer agent showing the name of issuing 
corporation, date of issue, par value, cost of acquisition, and that the 
shares of stock owned by the beneficiary have been sold at the price 
indicated. 
SEC. 58. Transfer of savings; remittance of salaries. Remittances for transfer of savings 
and salaries shall be governed by the following: 
a. Transfer of savings of expatriate employee may be allowed in full, net of taxes, when the 
contract of employment has been concluded or the employee is transferred to other offices 
abroad. The request for remittance shall be supported by the following documents: 
1. Contract of employment; 
2. Certification of the employer that the contract has been terminated or concluded; 
3. Statement of salaries paid during the validity of the contract of employment 
4. Transcript of bank deposit account certified by the bank official. If the amount to be 
remitted comes from new deposits (less than one year placement), information 
regarding the sources of funds, supported by appropriate documents shall be 
submitted; and 
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5. Proof of payment of corresponding taxes. 
b. Remittance of salaries of expatriate employee shall be allowed in amount not more than 
fifty percent (50%) of the salary, net of withholding tax, and shall be supported by: 
1. Copy of the employment contract; 
2. Copy of valid "Alien Employment Permit" issued by the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment; 
3. Proof of payment of withholding tax; 
4. Statement of salaries paid, duly certified by the employer; and 
5. Proof of inward remittances to cover salary of the expatriate employee in case of 
multinationals. 
SEC. 59. Freight charges. The following rules shall govern payments of freight charges: 
a. With prior approval of the Central Bank, all payments for freight charges covering 
Philippine imports loaded on board Philippine flag vessels and airlines and/or alien flag vessels 
and airlines which are operated or chartered by Philippine residents may be made in the 
Philippines in pesos or in other freely convertible foreign currencies. Philippine resident 
operators or charterers shall accept Philippine pesos offered as payments in the Philippines for 
such freights. 
b. Peso freight payments covering Philippine imports shipped on "Free on Board" (FOB) 
basis are remittable in foreign currency by local shipping agents/forwarders to their principals 
abroad. Applications for such remittances may be filed with the Central Bank through agent 
banks subject to documentation requirements which shall include, among others, the following: 
1. Statement of net revenues and expenses certified by an independent certified public 
accountant attesting to the fact that the net peso revenues appearing therein have not 
yet been remitted; 
2. Copy of the bill of lading covering the import shipment certified as authentic by an 
authorized official of the local shipping agent or representatives of the shipping 
company concerned. If the shipment is without L/C, copy of Central Bank 
authority to import under D/A arrangement or to export the commodities under a 
no-L/C arrangement shall be submitted; and 
3. If applicable, information as to balance sheet account where the obligations due was 
lodged. 
c. All application for forward exchange cover and/or applications for remittances of foreign 
exchange in payment of freight charges for crude oil imports of local oil companies shall be 
supported with clearance from the Bureau of Energy Utilization, stating that the Philippine 
National Oil Company and/or its affiliates and subsidiaries did not have the appropriate and/or 
required tonnage capability, whether owned, chartered or hired to transport the crude oil for 
which freight payment remittance is requested. 
97 
SEC. 60. Insurance. The following rules shall govern remittances of net profits, reinsurance 
premiums and payment of claims for losses: 
a. Peso deposit accounts. 
1. Authorized agent banks may open and maintain peso deposit accounts in the name 
of non-resident foreign insurers or non- resident foreign reinsurance brokers; 
Provided, That said accounts shall be credited only with proceeds of inward 
remittances of foreign exchange and by reinsurance premiums collected and/or 
received from local ceding companies; Provided, further, That the deposit is 
supported by a certification of the Insurance Commissioner to the effect that: 
a) The ceding companies are under obligation to remit to the non- resident 
foreign insurer or reinsurance broker the amount to be deposited; 
b) The ceding companies have withheld portion of the premium required by law 
for treaty reinsurance to be held as reserve and have reinvested the reserve 
funds in accordance with the provisions of the Insurance Code; 
c) The ceding companies have certified that they have withheld the required taxes 
in accordance with the Internal Revenue rules and regulations of the 
Philippines. 
2. There shall be no restrictions on withdrawals from such deposits; Provided, That 
withdrawals for remittance abroad against such deposits shall be allowed subject to 
the submission of a certification from the Insurance Commissioner. 
b. Application for remittances - Every application for the purchase of foreign exchange for 
remittance of net profits, reinsurance premiums and payments of claims for losses of branches of 
foreign insurance companies authorized to do business in the Philippines shall be accompanied 
with the following documents: 
1. Proof of Central Bank registration/approval of the inward investment 
2. Certification of the Insurance Commissioner that the applicant has complied with 
the requirements of the Insurance Commission on the remittance of profits, 
reinsurance and payments of claims for losses; 
3. Statement of account or notice of demand; and 
4. Latest audited financial statements. 
Additionally, the following supporting papers shall be required on remittances of: 
a) Net profits - If the applicant is a Philippine agent of the beneficiary (foreign 
principal), a copy of the agency contract and an affidavit of an authorized 
official of the agency stating that the beneficiary is not maintaining a branch 
office or does not have a general manager in the Philippines as verified by the 
Insurance Commission shall be submitted. 
A Philippine agent of a foreign insurance company with branch office or 
general manager in the Philippines shall not be allowed to remit its net 
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premium collections direct to the head office of its principal abroad. Such net 
premium collections should be delivered by the agent to the beneficiary's 
(foreign principal's) branch office or general manager in the Philippines. 
b) Reinsurance premium - If the applicant is a resident reinsurance broker (a 
reinsurance broker authorized to do business in the Philippines), authority in 
writing by the ceding resident insurance company to remit reinsurance to the 
accepting non-resident foreign reinsurer or non-resident foreign broker abroad 
covering reinsurance placed with such reinsurer or through such broker by the 
resident reinsurance broker shall be submitted. 
If the accepting foreign insurer or reinsurer is duly authorized by the 
Insurance Commissioner to do insurance or reinsurance business in the 
Philippines, the resident ceding company shall not be allowed to remit 
reinsurance premium to the Head Office abroad of the accepting foreign 
insurers or reinsurer. Such premium payment shall instead be delivered by the 
resident ceding company to the branch office in the Philippines of the 
accepting foreign insurer/reinsurer abroad. 
c) Payments of claims for losses - For payment of claims for losses and other 
cases of insurance and/or reinsurance payment not specifically covered by the 
above rules, the agent banks shall require the applicant to submit the pertinent 
documents to the Insurance Commissioner for prior clearance on a 
case-to-case basis. 
SEC. 61. Commissions. Remittances of commissions shall be governed by the following 
rules: 
a. Agency agreement for the sale of airline and shipping tickets shall be submitted to the 
Central Bank for approval. 
b. Commission earnings of airline or shipping companies in foreign currencies shall be 
reported to the Central Bank. 
c. Commissions of travel agents and tour operators of airline and shipping companies shall be 
paid in the same currency in which the tickets have been paid for, 
d. Authorized agent banks may allow foreign airline and shipping companies to remit their 
revenues to their head offices, net of commissions, with the prior approval of the Central Bank. 
e. Remittance in payment of commissions shall be supported by the following: 
1. Computation showing how the amount sought to be remitted was arrived at (in no 
case to exceed 5% of the FOB price of the export shipment). Agency agreements 
calling for commission payments in excess of 5% shall have the prior approval of 
the Central Bank. 
2. Evidence of export shipment, such as bills of lading 
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3. Certification from the negotiating bank concerned that the export proceeds have 
been inwardly remitted accompanied by the bank's credit advice; and 
4. Latest audited financial statement of the applicant 
SEC. 62. Maintenance of trade offices abroad. Remittances for the maintenance of 
overseas trade offices abroad shall be governed by the following rules: 
a. Authorized agent banks may act on the request for foreign exchange remittances to 
maintain overseas trade offices of an export trader registered under Republic Act 6135 up to 
$100,000 per year per overseas office for operating expenses. 
b. Requests for remittances of foreign exchange to maintain branch office abroad of 
Philippine companies shall be supported by the following documents: 
1. Copy of the authority to establish the branch office abroad; 
2. Evidence of the establishment of the office abroad, including approval of the 
appropriate government agency where the office is established; 
3. Copy of the latest financial statements of the head office duly certified by an 
independent CPA; 
4. Billings/statement of accounts to support the disbursements from the maintenance 
fund; 
5. Report of foreign exchange operations of the branch, duly certified by the Branch 
Manager concerned; 
6. Proof that the branch office abroad is generating economic benefit for the country; 
and 
7. Proof that the operating expenses of the branch abroad is being derived from the 
profits generated by the company. 
OTHER DISBURSEMENTS/PAYMENTS FOR INVISIBLES 
SEC. 63. Remittances for other disbursements/payments. The following rules shall 
govern requests for remittances not specifically covered by the foregoing provisions: 
a. With prior Central Bank approval, applications for foreign exchange to cover current 
invisible payments under this Section shall be duly supported by appropriate documents as may 
be required. 
b. Central Bank clearance/approval shall be required in payments of foreign exchange for the 
following: 
1. Passenger fares - These are payments by residents to foreign carriers in connection 
with transport of persons and shall be supported by: 
a) List of passenger ticket issued by the carrier; 
b) Proof of payment of the corresponding taxes; 
c) Statement of Revenue and Expenses certified by an independent CPA; 
d) Statement of gross Philippine billing corresponding to the period covered by 
the remittance, duly certified by an independent CPA; 
e) Report on tax exemptions given to non-resident passengers. 
2. Time charters - These are payments by domestic operators to foreigners for hire of 
foreign-owned vessels and shall be supported by: 
a) Copy of Central bank approval of the Charter Hire Contract which may be 
submitted only once with the initial application for remittance of charter fees; 
b) Copy of clearance/authority from the proper government agency for the 
chartered trips; 
c) Copy of the latest income tax return of charterer; 
d) Latest audited financial statements of charterer; 
e) Billings/statement of account from the creditor, duly certified by an 
independent CPA; and 
f) Proof that the required report covering the foreign exchange earnings of the 
charterer has been submitted to the Central Bank and the proceeds from the 
operation of the chartered vessel/craft have been remitted inward. 
3. Institutional remittances - These are donations made by resident private institutions, 
including missionary, educational and other benevolent contributions and shall be 
supported by: 
a) Acceptance of the donation by the donee, indicating his exact address. 
b) Copy of the latest income tax return of donor and proof of payment of 
applicable tax; 
4. Gifts/Donations - Gifts, donations and contributions in excess of US$100 to any one 
beneficiary shall be referred to the Central Bank for prior approval. 
5. Personal remittances - These are donations made by residents to non-residents. The 
supporting documents in Item 3 above shall be required to support these 
remittances. 
6. Management dues and registrations fees - These cover payments of membership 
dues and registration fees to associations abroad. Remittances for these purposes 
shall be supported by: 
a) Copy of the Articles of Incorporation/ Partnership of the remitting firm 
together with copy of certificate of registration of its business name, 
whichever is applicable. 
b) Proof of membership in the foreign association; 
c) Billings for membership dues or fees; 
d) Copy of the latest audited financial statements and proof of payment of 
applicable taxes. 
7. Management fees - These cover payments for management fees of firms or 
individuals by local firms or individuals, for services rendered and shall be 
supported by: 
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a) Duly registered "Management Agreement Contract" as approved by the 
Central Bank; 
b) Audited financial statement and proof of payment of applicable taxes; 
c) Official receipt covering the remittance net of withholding tax, if any. 
8. Tuition fees to correspondence schools abroad - These cover payments made 
directly to the correspondence school and shall be supported by: 
a) Proof of admission or enrollment in the correspondence school. 
b) Proof of previous remittances; 
c) Justification for the correspondent study, together with curriculum of courses 
offered and statement of fees, dues, total cost of the course and schedule of 
payments; 
d) Latest income tax return of the applicant or of the person financing the 
schooling; and 
e) Billings from the school abroad. 
9. Advertising - These are payments for the advertisements of local firms in 
publications abroad and shall be accompanied by: 
a) Duly signed statement of account and bills of advertising fees; 
b) Proof of advertisement such as newspaper clippings or appropriate page of the 
magazine where the advertisement was made; and 
c) Justification why the advertisement was made abroad. 
10. Subscriptions - These shall cover payments on subscriptions to foreign 
publications. Remittance in payment of subscriptions to magazines and other 
reading materials shall be supported by a statement of account and billings as well 
as proof of the subscriptions. 
11. Retainers' fees - These refer to payments by local firms or individuals to foreign 
retainers, which shall be supported by the following: 
a) Duly registered Retainer Contract as approved by the Central Bank; 
b) Justification why such retainership agreement was entered into; 
c) Audited financial statements of the individual/corporation/firm/engaging the 
foreign retainer. 
SEC. 64. Other remittances. The following disbursements may also be allowed, subject to 
Central Bank approval; Provided, That they are reasonable and necessary; that the services, 
benefits or transactions are not available locally; and the remittances are duly supported by 
necessary documents showing the veracity of the transactions, which shall include, among others: 
(a) duly certified statements of accounts, bills, invoices; (b) proof of payment of applicable taxes; 
(c) audited financial statements certified by an independent CPA, if applicable; and (d) agreement 
contracts, if any. 
1. Port disbursements abroad other than for time charters by domestic carriers 
including payments to foreigners for bunker fuel, ship's stores and similar supplies, 
harbor and airfield fees, tonnage and repairs and maintenance; 
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2. Disbursements to foreign carriers from residents for mail fees and salvage earnings. 
3. Fees for comic strips published in local publications. 
4. Disbursements to cover international settlement on account, postage, use of 
telegraph, telegram, cable, radio and other medium of communication facilities. 
5. Payments for rebates, discounts and penalties due to specification deficiencies on 
exports. 
6. Payments for income and real property taxes due to foreign governments. 
7. Disbursements involving cancellation and refund due to transfer instruments 
previously credited to the account of the Central Bank and the corresponding 
adjusting entries. 
8. Payments for health and medical expenses to be incurred abroad. Payment of this 
kind shall be accompanied with a certification under oath of non-availability of 
local medical facilities and reasonableness of the amount applied for. 
Payments shall be remitted directly to the hospital/doctor abroad, after showing 
proof of confinement/treatment and statement of account and/or other bills of 
expenses. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
SEC. 65, Means of servicing payments of invisibles. Commercial banks shall service the 
remittance covering payments for invisibles by means of telegraphic transfer, mail transfer or 
demand draft, except that in the case of remittance by demand draft the selling bank shall mail 
the demand draft directly to the beneficiary abroad. 
SEC. 66. Processing of applications. The following procedures shall be followed in 
processing foreign exchange applications: 
a. Commercial banks shall inform applicants that foreign exchange application shall be filed 
through authorized agent banks and not directly with the Central Bank. 
b. Commercial banks shall undertake the initial processing of foreign exchange applications 
to determine whether the documents submitted by applicants in support of applications are 
complete as required under pertinent guidelines. 
c. Commercial banks shall furnish the Central Bank with the names of their accredited liaison 
officer with whom consultations may be made. 
d. Only requests and applications requiring Central Bank clearance/prior approval shall be 
referred to the Central Bank. 
Supervisory Authority of the Central Bank 
SEC. 67. Verification. The head of the appropriate department of the Central Bank, 
personally or by deputy shall, when necessary, look into the books of accounts and transactions 
of each authorized agent bank to verify bank's compliance with the provisions of the law and 
these regulations. 
Source: Central Bank Circular No. 960-
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